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Introduction 
 
Given the central place of energy in mediating the socio-
ecological interface, how we conceptualise energy transition will 
greatly impact the shape of society to come. And yet, 
technocratic evolutionary models that separate questions of 
economic organisation from their social and ecological 
contexture prevail. Economists concerned with energy 
transition frequently take the socio-technical systems (STS) 
approach, which avers interrogating the entrenched power 
relations maintaining the predominance of market-dependence 
and commodification in energy transition. Consistent with the 
other prevailing contemporary narrative, that of the accelerating 
proliferation of network technologies (Greenfield 2017), the 
STS imaginary frames energy transition as a massively dispersed 
coordination problem whose solution lies in promoting 
technical systems through market-based mechanisms. Transition 
becomes a problem of technological viability followed by 
economic feasibility, arbitrated by financial assessments such as 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance group’s authoritative annual 
New Energy Outlook.1 
 
Despite the inadequacy of this approach, acknowledged even by 
leading financial analysts, policy across the OECD and in 
Australia remains tied to the incentivisation of increased 
renewable uptake through market-based-mechanisms (Climate 
Council 2017). Maintaining the stability of the socio-economic 
                                                      
1 BNEF’s 2017 publication expected $10.2tn to be invested in new 
power generation worldwide by 2040, of which renewables composed 
72%, with wind and solar accounting for 48% of installed capacity and 
34% of electricity generation. Nevertheless, they concede that ‘the rate 
of decline in emissions is not nearly enough for the climate. A further 
$5.3tn investment in 3.9TW of zero-carbon capacity will be needed to 
ensure a 2-degree-warming scenario.’ See: Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance, 15 June 2017, New Energy Outlook 2017.  
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system, and as such, ‘sustainability’, has come to signify the 
maintenance of the preexisting (and culpable) mode of 
production, rather than protection of the ecosystem whose 
endangerment was the raison d’être of environmentalism (Paton 
2008). Critical voices highlight the undemocratic imposition of 
such technology upon us, the growing distance between those 
with a grasp of these technical systems and those without, and 
the inadequacy of market-based mechanisms in precipitating a 
sufficiently rapid transition (Dean 2009; Goodman and 
Rosewarne 2011; Swyngedouw et al. 2015). Yet few consider the 
potential of such technological ensembles to facilitate an 
ecologically acceptable future, as the technologists would have 
it, and also to democratise the underlying social relations of 
ownership of energy production.  
 
Contemporaneously, there are calls for critical thought to turn 
toward an ‘ecosophy’, an ‘object-oriented ontology’, a ‘post-
humanism’, a ‘planetary consciousness’, to reframe our 
philosophical models toward a less harmful existence, to dwell 
more attentively in the Anthropocene (Guattari 2000; Morton 
2013; Braidotti 2010; Chakrabarty 2016). This growing chorus 
asserts that mechanistic analytical tools have become obsolete, 
that the shifting ground - the complex crisis of convergence 
which ‘changes everything’ - requires new synthetic and 
interdisciplinary approaches in the social sciences (Klein 2015). 
The recent emergence of ‘energy humanities’ is testament of this 
drive to critically engage the technical and natural sciences 
(Mitchell 2011; Huber 2013; Szeman and Boyer 2017). Its 
scholars’ common refrain is that each ecological event is 
invariably socio-economically mediated, that energy resources 
only become so through the means of production that 
necessitate and create them. It has generated two salient 
concepts in ‘energopower/energopolitics’ and ‘energy 
democracy’. The first beckons an alternative ‘genealogy of 
modern power that rethinks political power through the twin 
analytics of electricity and fuel’ (Boyer 2014: 22). The latter 
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describes an ideal-type model for ‘socially just, sustainable and 
collectively controlled energy arrangements’ (Transnational 
Institute 2016: 4). However, this tradition is rooted in critical 
anthropology, whose localist politics have also been ignored by 
eco-Marxists, disregarded for failing to launch a deeper critique 
at the value-relation. 
 
Nevertheless, ecologically-oriented historical materialism does 
provide a more tractable understanding of the interface between 
human and extra-human nature as dynamic, constantly 
transformed by human labour and its products. In John Bellamy 
Foster’s well-known formulation, the human acts ‘upon external 
nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes 
his own nature’ (Foster 2000: 157).  This is developed around 
the central metaphor of metabolism, inspired by the scientific-
materialist aspects of Marx’s own commentary (Marx 1976: 284-
90). Jason Moore’s (2015) recent intervention contends that this 
metabolic metaphor does not go far enough, for it still poses 
extra-human nature as an externalised phenomenon without 
facilitating an understanding of how capitalist projects 
themselves internalise and are internalised by extra-human 
natures. He writes, 
 
a reading of metabolism that takes seriously the centrality of 
value as a logic of re/producing the flow of life helps us see 
how capitalism has created and transcended limits. Taking an 
expanded conception of value-relations, we can better 
interpret the ways in which the worlds of humanity-in-nature 
become valued and de-valued over the past five centuries, 
converting the globe into a vast storehouse of unpaid 
work/energy… Marx’s conception of value relations, in 
other words, provides a way of seeing the exploitation of 
labour-power and the appropriation of unpaid work as a 
singular metabolism of many determinations. (Moore 2015: 
81) 
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In updating value-relations to account for the co-production of 
‘abstract social labour’, the substance of capitalist value, and 
‘abstract social nature’, the reconstituted extra-human natures 
put to work for reproducing capitalist value-generation, world-
ecology hopes to reintegrate ecological historical materialism 
and value theory. Imperative to this analysis are capitalist technics, 
‘crystallisations of tools and ideas, power and nature [in order 
to] appropriate the wealth of uncommodified nature in service 
to advancing labour productivity’ (Moore 2015: 59). Surprisingly 
little attention has been paid to the dynamic by which technics 
condition appropriation and exploitation. The means of energy 
production, as a fundamental appropriative technics, must be 
given greater consideration. The following chapters attempt to 
address this lacuna in ecologically-oriented historical materialism 
by proposing different points of departure for understanding 
technicity in capital.  
 
This thesis investigates the opportunities and constraints facing 
an approach to energy transition in Australia which addresses 
the ecological problem of carbon emissions as not divorced 
from the socio-political and technical context, but 
fundamentally constituted in and through that context. A 
historical materialist methodology is adopted to gain a realistic 
assessment of the institutional actors and how their interactions 
shape the topology of the energy sector. The analysis proceeds 
from a present conjunctural moment of energetic, economic, 
and ecological ‘triple crisis’ (Dawson 2010; Chester 2013a; Geels 
2013). Crises typically present disregarded possibilities as newly 
opportune. This investigation considers the internal relations 
between each dimension of the conjunctural crisis, and how 
their conjoined resolution can herald deeper transformation in 
the social relations around energy production.  
 
Chapter 1 develops a critical methodological and conceptual 
approach toward energy transition around Moore’s ‘world-
ecological’ Marxism (2011, 2015a).  It provides two core 
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concepts in the ‘world-ecological surplus’ and its tendency to 
fall, and ‘Cheap Energy’, arising from the use of appropriative 
technics. Nevertheless, the framework is critically probed for its 
dichotomised treatment of exploitative and appropriative 
processes, and for lacking institutionally-cognisant texture; its 
civilisational-scale explanans erases the constitutive role of 
states, firms, social movements in materialising the value-
relations that perform or resist how capitalism ‘organises nature’ 
(Out of the Woods 2016). Moore’s framework might usefully be 
supplemented with insights from Marxist state theory (Jessop 
2016; Parenti 2015) and financial and post-Fordist value theory 
(Bryan et al 2015; Marrazzi 2010) to develop a robust critical 
framework that illuminates the financial-technical elements of 
the present convergent energy crisis and generates points of 
departure for tratcable political responses. 
 
Chapter 2 presents three engagements with theories of 
technicity that sets the world-ecological framework in dialogue 
with the prevailing mainstream Socio-Technical Systems (STS) 
transition theory, the dominant approach to conceptualising 
energy transition. By tracing STS’s genealogy to Schumpeterian 
economics, a connection to Marxist theories of long-wave 
technological change is revealed, whose chief difference turns 
upon the presence of a value-theory and the explanatory role 
played by labour and class struggle (Tyfield 2014). The second 
engagement presents anthropological theories of energy 
technologies, which prove more attendant to how social 
relations are influenced by infrastructures and discourses than 
world-ecology or STS. Finally, the chapter elaborates a 
philosophical approach to technicity as bounded by socio-
economic context (and hence, capitalist value-relations) whilst 
creative of new social opportunities (such as communal 
syndicalism and/or networked individualism).  
 
Chapter 3 presents a world-ecological account of ‘Cheap 
Energy’ in Australia, with emphasis upon the interrelations of 
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the state-system, capital, energy infrastructure and climatic 
feedback. A twofold narrative emerges, in which the state-
system mobilises its strategic projects through, on the one hand, 
national developmentalism promoting domestic energy security 
and, on the other, international competitiveness, creating the 
conditions for Cheap Energy exports (Baer 2016; Crough & 
Wheelwright 1982). The present ‘triple crisis’ is illuminated by 
reference to the ‘negative-value’ (Moore 2015: 275-9) faced by 
capital sunk in energy projects due to the effects of an unruly 
climate, and social contestations whose cumulative effect has 
forced energy onto the political agenda, entrapping the state-
system further within the ‘climate dialectic’ (Goodman 2016). At 
this conjuncture, competing fractions of capital in concert with 
the state-system operate to mobilise contemporary technics that 
extend the commodity frontier, such that a new wave of Cheap 
Energy may be unleashed.  
 
Chapter 4 considers distributed energy resources (DERs), such 
as household solar photovoltaics, with respect to the expanding 
commodity frontier. Universally available and relatively cheap, 
they present a genuine alternative to centralised and market-
dependent electricity production. An analysis of independent, 
state-commissioned and network enterprise-funded assessments 
finds that their rapid uptake in Australia has challenged the 
viability of centralised electricity infrastructure and the financial 
energy market it underpins (Jacobs 2017; Finkel et al 2017; 
AEMO 2016). Interested capital has therefore sought to 
incorporate these newly autonomous generators into the value-
relation through numerous means, which are considered in turn. 
The response of the state-system has been contradictory, 
developing technologies that render extra-human natures (most 
saliently solar irradiation) legible, whilst subsidising the uptake 
of DERs through market-based mechanisms. The chapter 
concludes with a critical value-theoretical appraisal of the use of 
networked and financialised technics to capture DERs through 
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household attentional labour absorbing the risk of energy 
market volatility. 
 
The thesis concludes with an overview of the scope of 
community energy projects in Australia and a reflection on their 
capacity to prefigure an ‘energopolitics’ that meaningfully breaks 
with the capitalist value-relation. Considering the insights and 
limitations of autonomist Marxist literature and evidence from 
comparative case-studies of the German and Danish energy 
decentralised energy transitions, such projects are unlikely to 
transform social relations at the scale required to challenge 
centralised profit-oriented energy generation. Rather, by 
engaging a state-system already trapped within the pressure of 
the ‘climate dialectic’, such projects can achieve horizontal 
tesselation and vertical growth necessary to outweigh 
countervailing pressures to integrate DERs into centralised 
infrastructure and its attendant national electricity market. 
Whether such developments contribute toward the project of 
‘solar communism’ (Schwartzman 2016), ‘energy democracy’ 
(Scheer 2007), or are recuperated into a reconfigured ‘green 
capitalism’ (Paterson 2016) will depend upon a highly 
contingent coalitional grassroots politics already prefigured but 
yet to achieve critical influence within the state-system.  
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Chapter 1. An Appraisal and Extension 
of World-Ecology 
 
Approaching energy transition critically demands a synthetic 
analysis sensitive to the interlocking political, economic and 
ecological determinants and effects of the mode of energy use 
and production.  Jason Moore’s world-ecological framework 
provides such a political-economy, developing an account of the 
double-internality of socio-economic projects and ecological 
processes, revealing capitalism as at once a ‘way of organising 
nature’ and enmeshed and reconstituted ‘in the web of life’. It 
integrates the insights of Luxemburgian-Gramscian 
geographers, an attendance to global socioeconomic 
dependencies of the Annales-school and world-systems 
theorists, and the patterns of socio-ecological metabolism 
revealed by ecological-Marxism. This chapter moves on to 
consider the criticism that have been raised of world-ecology’s 
lack of political tractability, which are addressed through a 
supplementation of its value-theory and institutional-theory. 
 
1.1 Genealogy and methodology of world-ecology 
 
Early commentators noted that Marx’s analysis of capital as self-
expanding value (M-C-M’ or C-M-C’) required the extension 
and intensification of market-oriented production. Its 
geographic implication is the extension of commodity frontiers 
through processes of ‘primitive accumulation’ that liberate 
labour, land and resources to become internalised into markets 
and commodification. However, whilst Marx consigned this 
process to the pre-history of capital, geographers following 
Luxemburg understand these processes as continually ongoing, 
the necessary double to capitalist production. For Luxemburg, 
the realisation of surplus value ‘requires as its prime 
condition...that there should be strata of buyers outside capitalist 
society’ (Luxemburg [1913]2003: 332). Rather than relegate 
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‘primitive accumulation’ to capitalism’s past, ‘capitalism in its 
full maturity also depends in all respects on non-capitalist strata 
and social organisations existing side-by-side with it ... since the 
accumulation of capital becomes impossible in all points 
without non-capitalist surroundings’ (Luxemburg [1913]2003: 
345). In accounting for the material projects that constitute such 
outward expansion, Harvey (1981) provided a critical theory of 
‘spatial fix’, referring to the dynamic by which the initial 
flexibility achieved for capital through the built environment, i.e. 
capital-intensive infrastructures, becomes a fetter on future 
accumulation, necessitating their destabilisation. Harvey further 
extended Luxemburg’s analysis into the neoliberal era, wherein 
he identified financialised ‘accumulation by dispossession’, such 
as through the imposition of ‘debt encumbrancy’, as the 
prevailing mode through which core capitals seek to resolve the 
contradictory outcomes of their activities abroad (Harvey 2003: 
74).  
 
World-systems theory, following the dependency-theorists of 
the 1960s, emphasises the world-system, rather than nation 
states, as the primary unit of social analysis, explaining the 
uneven and combined development of the global economy. 
Wallerstein’s (1974) account of the stratification of global 
economic power relations traced how regional patterns of class 
conflict affected associated modes of agricultural production, 
while Braudel’s (1979, 1981) contribution emphasised ecological 
factors in the making of world-systems. The capitalist world-
economy was first posited as the outcome of a conjuncture in 
which the interests of states, seigniors and city-states favoured 
outer rather than inner expansion (Moore 2000: 133). Arrighi 
periodised the development of the world-system according to 
systemic cycles of accumulation, characterised by  
 
the alternation of epochs of material expansion with phases of 
financial rebirth and expansion. In phases of material expansion 
money capital “sets in motion” an increasing mass of 
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commodities (including commoditized labor-power and gifts of 
nature); and in phases of financial expansion an increasing mass 
of money capital “sets itself free” from its commodity form, 
and accumulation proceeds through financial deals. (Arrighi 
1994: 6) 
 
As will be seen in the next chapter, world-systemicists are in 
close dialogue with other theories of Kondratieff technological 
long-waves and present a geographic Marxist interpretation, 
highlighting the alternation between phases of continuous and 
discontinuous changes.2   
 
O’Connor (1988) pioneered the critical albeit sympathetic 
ecological engagement with Marxist value theory, introducing 
the concept of a second contradiction of capitalism alongside the 
orthodox primary contradiction between the forces and 
relations of production (O’Connor 1988). This was between 
capitalist relations and forces on one hand and conditions of 
production on the other. While the primary contradiction 
promotes a tendency toward the overproduction of capital with 
an attendant economic crisis leading to restructuring of 
productive forces and productive relations, the second 
contradiction leads to the underproduction of capital, and the 
restructuring of the conditions of concrete production and the 
social relations they entail (O’Connor 1988). Burkett (1999) 
demonstrates how as human labour is the constituent substance 
of value, the non-human ‘natural’ conditions of production 
become devalued, and its throughput increasingly intensified 
through its ‘free appropriation’ to maximise the productivity of 
the more valuable labour component, with increasingly 
                                                      
2 Although Arrighi does suggest that ‘secular price cycles and systemic 
cycles of accumulation are completely out of synchrony with one 
another. A financial expansion is equally likely to come at the 
beginning, middle, or end of a secular (price) cycle’ (Arrighi 1994: 7).  
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devastating ecological consequences. Foster’s (2000) well-known 
theory of socio-ecological ‘metabolic rift’ considered Marx’s 
concern with the effects of capitalist agricultural practices upon 
soil fertility, understood as generating a ‘rift’ in the ‘metabolic 
interaction between man and the earth’ through the ‘robbing of 
the soil of its constituent elements’ (Foster 2000: 156).  In this 
manner, eco-Marxism developed a foundational socioecological 
concept, attendant to how economic developments ruptured 
ecological patterns of material exchange through which societies 
reproduced themselves.  
 
Value is mobilised in the world-ecological framework for its 
succinct expression of the antagonism of monetary 
accumulation and material transformation in commodity 
production, and for its conjoined treatments of capital 
accumulation as an objective process and as a subjective project. 
For Moore, it offers ‘a promising way to comprehend the inner 
connections between accumulation, biophysical change, and 
modernity as a whole’ (Moore 2011: 20). Moore’s chief 
departure from orthodox Marxist value theory arises in his 
account of how the productivity of socially necessary abstract 
labour time (SNALT), still taken to be the fundamental 
‘substance’ of value, rises not only through capitalisation of the 
means of production, but also through incorporating 
appropriated work/energy of human and extra-human natures 
into production. Moore writes, 
 
the tendential generalisation of value relations works 
through a dialectic of capitalising production and 
appropriating reproduction. Value is encoded simultaneously 
through the exploitation of labour-power in commodity 
production, and through the appropriation of nature’s life-
making capacities. (Moore 2015: 13)   
 
Moore proposes a ‘general law of underproduction’, linked to 
Marx’s better-theorised tendency to the overproduction of capital 
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goods. This account sees the circuit of capital as a 
socioecological relation composed of ‘constant’ capital – itself 
comprised of fixed capital (machinery and extra-human forces of 
production that outlast the production cycle) and circulating 
capital (energy and raw materials used up during the production 
cycle) – and ‘variable’ capital (i.e. labour). For Marx, ‘the rate of 
profit is inversely proportional to the value of the raw materials’, 
and yet the dynamism of capitalist production ensures that the 
‘portion of constant capital that consists of fixed capital … 
[tends to] run significantly ahead of the portion consisting of 
raw organic materials, so that the demand for those raw 
materials grows more rapidly than their supply’ (Marx 
[1883]1959: 118-9). The availability of cheaply acquired inputs 
thereby becomes the condition for large-scale industry and 
expanded commodity production in general.  
 
The world-ecological surplus refers to the share of surplus value 
produced through accumulation by appropriation, which can 
proceed by either pivoting off biophysical reproduction, or on 
the geological extraction of minerals and energy (Moore 2011: 
21-22). It occurs when relatively small amounts of capital are set 
in motion to appropriate disproportionately greater volumes of 
unpaid work/energy. Echoing the tendency of the profit rate to 
fall, the ecological surplus also bears a tendency to fall through 
four conjoined processes: (1) general “wear and tear” of extra-
human natures through entropic degradation, (2) the mass of 
accumulated capital tending to outpace the mass of appropriated 
work/energy, (3) the contradiction between the time necessary 
for the reproduction of capital and that for the rest of natures, 
(4) capital’s operation generating wasteful negative-value, i.e. the 
‘historical natures that are increasingly hostile to capital 
accumulation’ (Moore 2015: 98). When the underproduction of 
the conditions for production threaten to fetter the continued 
accumulation of capital, ‘world-ecological revolutions’ are set in 
motion to achieve an ecological-surplus that enables continued 
capital accumulation in the mid-to-long term (Moore 2015: 150).  
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The role of technics is critical in this process, whereby 
‘innovations of capital, science and empire forge a new unity of 
abstract social labor, abstract social nature and primitive 
accumulation [whose] successful converge restores the [Cheap 
Nature] (Ibid). In contrasting technics to technology, Moore defers 
to Mumford’s (1934) characterisation of technics as ‘extra-
economic processes - perhaps directly coercive, but also cultural 
and calculative - through which capital gains access to minimally 
or non-commodified natures for free’ (Moore 2015: 95). 
Technics provide the social contexture that directs technologies 
and gives them significance, enabling ‘technological revolutions 
[to become] epoch-making only when joined to those imperial 
and scientific projects that revolutionised world-ecological 
space’ (Moore 2015: 153).  Elsewhere, they are described as the 
crystallising of ‘tools and knowledge, nature and power, in a new 
world-praxis that reduced both “man” and “nature” to 
abstractions’, which embodied capitalist power and production 
through ‘a vast cultural-symbolic repertoire that was cause, 
condition and consequence of modernity’s specific form of 
technical advance’ (Moore 2015: 174-5).  
 
Developing a world-ecological approach to historicising Cheap 
Energy requires enfolding energy resource measures into an 
historical-relational frame; something Moore (2015) attempts to 
achieve with ‘Energy Returned on Capital Invested’, a model of 
accumulation that unifies energy and capital as joules per dollar 
(Moore 2015: 106). The question of a ‘peak’ in Cheap Energy is 
therefore measurable by the peak ‘gap’ between capital set in 
motion to produce a given commodity and the work/energy 
embodied in the commodity. Yet this is methodologically 
problematic, requiring an incommensurable mix of specific 
work/energies, as ‘energy/material flows can be measured but 
they cannot be counted, for capital’s dynamism counts only 
what it values, i.e. labour productivity’. Instead, the world-
ecology of Cheap Energy is less concerned about the specific 
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mechanism of its extraction and more concerned about how 
capitalism reduces its basic costs of production (Moore 2015: 
145-7). Energy sources are particularly significant to the world-
ecological framework as the value of energy is closely linked to 
the productivity of labour-power, and rising energy prices and 
stagnant labour productivity growth are closely linked 
(Jorgenson 1984: 26-30).  
 
Through the technics of industrial capitalism, coal was central to 
advancing labour productivity thanks to steam power and new 
frontiers of appropriation. Similarly, resource geography has 
demonstrated how petroleum-based energy ‘crises’ have been 
inextricable from oligopolistic market control necessitated by 
the materiality of oil (Bridge 2010: 318). In the neoliberal era, 
the rise and fall of oil as primary commodity is partly explicable 
by financialisation as ‘an increasingly important socio-ecological 
vector [which has induced] underinvestment in the extractive 
apparatus proper in favour of short-term speculative 
movements’ (Moore 2015: 148). The financialisation of 
commodity markets increasingly dissolves the boundaries 
between separate energy commodity price-determinants, no 
longer simply determined by their supply and demand (Tang 
and Xiong 2011).  
 
Moore proposes that capitalism’s original underproduction crisis 
is re-emerging through an unstable combination of physical 
depletion, climate change, new anti-systemic movements and 
financialisation (Moore 2015: 91-92). The strategic question not 
posed by Moore, however, is how to ensure that such a 
convergent crisis only affects the errant structures of capital 
while ensuring that sustainable social relations can arise 
concurrently (Nelson 2016). To this end, Moore proposes the 
groundwork for a post-human labour politics, arising from the 
excessive liveliness of nature in general: ‘all life rebels against the 
value/monoculture nexus of modernity, from farm to factory… 
Extra-human natures, too, resist the grim compulsions of 
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economic equivalence’ (Moore 2015: 205). Yet, as Nelson 
(2016) argues, Moore’s critique of Nature/Society dualisms  
 
fails to attend to the intersectional processes through which 
these categories themselves are transformed as the line 
separating production and reproduction (and thereby 
capitalisation and appropriation) is reworked throughout 
capitalist history … Moore leaves the category of labour 
unproblematised, sidelining qualitative and historical changes 
in the way that socio-ecological capacities are both exploited 
and appropriated (Nelson 2016: 12-13).  
 
Moore’s call for a ‘socialist ecology’ using non-capitalist 
technologies (particularly agronomies such as agro-ecology and 
permaculture) does not articulate the criteria for what makes 
technologies inherently non-capitalist. As Nelson highlights, 
even technologies celebrated for inaugurating postcapitalist 
ecologies may become recuperated into capitalist military and 
industrial research (Ibid). To develop a critical engagement with 
technics, value-relations and post-capitalism, we must inquire 
into the changing ways that Nature/Society operate as ‘real 
abstractions’. Hence, before moving on to marking out a critical 
theory of technicity, we will turn to Marxist theories of finance, 
biocapital, and spatial politics, which together elucidate the 
kinds of social forms within which non-capitalism may flourish. 
 
1.2 Challenging value in world-ecology: Marxist 
theories of finance and biocapital 
 
How can we draw boundaries between exploitative and 
appropriative processes, given the operation of contemporary 
financialised and technologically-mediated value-generating 
activities? As Political Marxist historians have demonstrated, the 
law of value can only become operative where the capitalist 
mode of production prevails, where the means of production 
are themselves exchanged and the producer faces the direct 
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necessity to expend an amount of labour-time on them (Weeks 
2010). Robert Brenner illustrates this point with respect to 
market-dependence, a state where economic producers are devoid 
of the full means of subsistence and the ability to secure such 
subsistence by force from direct producers, who must buy their 
inputs on the market and sell their products on the market and 
thereby be subject to competitive constraint (Brenner 2007: 60-
1). But what of unpaid activities that produce work/energy 
within the reach of capital - are they subsumed in value-
relations, performing appropriative support to capitalised 
commodification, or do they exist ‘outside’ of it? With the near-
total enclosure of non-capitalist geographic boundaries, 
contemporary Marxist approaches have broached these 
questions through an account of the intensification of 
conditions for the value-relation, through the production of the 
bio-economy, mediated by the operation of finance.  
 
The Italian tradition of Autonomist workerism, pointedly rejects 
the world-systems functionalist account of finance as ‘signs of 
autumn’ of world-systemic cycles, and prefers to see its 
‘pervasive character in a capitalism that has assumed a radically 
new character in the last decades to the point where the very 
distinction between “real economy” and “financial economy” is 
today unfounded’ (Braudel 1984: 246; Mezzadra 2010: 11). This 
approach looks to the capitalisation of social relations to 
incorporate those not traditionally thought to be value-
generating; an approach with origins in feminist Marxism’s 
illumination of unpaid socially reproductive labour and in the 
German Neue Marx-Lekture tendency, who saw in the dialectic 
of the value-form an account of how the material aspects of 
social life are dominated by abstract ideal social-forms of value 
(Reichelt 1996: 46-47). The rise of information technologies and 
social networks have enabled collaborative efforts between 
humans (as well as non-humans) co-create cultural/virtual 
worlds. Because of the rise of the ‘network effect’, 
entrepreneurial effort has redirected into the conversion of such 
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networks into value (Castells 2004). The intensification of social 
aspects of market-dependence have thereby become closely 
connected with financialisation, which provides technical means 
by which the value of various aspects of production can be 
measured and equivocated when production is no longer about 
remunerated labour and discretely produced commodities. 
Valorisation processes require financial capital to become 
productive of the bioeconomy that ‘produces value by extracting 
it not only from the body functioning as the material instrument 
of work, but also from the body understood in its globality’ 
(Marrazzi 2010: 49). The consumer coproduces value in free 
labour, through creating markets, producing performance, 
managing risk, optimising platform-based assets such as 
software beta-testing, ‘a winning model for investors since it 
harnesses, incorporates, and valorises the social and 
technological labour of users’ (Terranova 2010: 155-156). Large 
quantities of surplus-value are unleashed, set in motion by Post-
Fordist accumulation processes decoupled from investment in 
constant and variable capital and redirected into ‘apparatuses of 
producing and capturing value produced outside directly 
productive processes’ (Marrazzi 2010: 55). The increased 
quantity of living labour thus explains the devaluation of 
classical means of production, with the consequent recourse to 
speculative ventures to increase shareholder value (Ibid: 63). As 
Wark summarises, ‘finance both predicts and actualises futures 
in which private companies extract value from the knowledge 
society, where the boundaries of who “owns” what can never be 
clear’ (Wark 2017: 67).  
 
Marxist perspectives of financialisation emphasise the importance 
of engaging with finance as a value-generative phenomenon, one 
that foundationally alters social and natural relations in 
accordance with equivalence and exchangeability. Moreover, such 
an approach is uniquely positioned to reveal how and why these 
processes, working through the risk-commodity, entail labour 
exploitation (Panitch and Gindin 2008: 308). One strand 
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proposes to focus on the production of financial risk as value-
generative (Bryan & Rafferty 2006; Bryan et al. 2015; 
Christophers 2011 and 2016). Market-based finance commodifies 
risk in the value-form of financial assets such as derivatives, 
which are priced, traded, bought and sold in financial markets. By 
applying abstraction to risk, modern finance brings to bear a 
significant technical apparatus upon particularised risk portfolios, 
rendering qualitatively different underlying assets through 
processes of ‘blending’ (Bryan & Rafferty 2006). The SNALT of 
‘society at large’ produces this value via the financialisation of 
everyday life, which has rendered many processes of social 
reproduction subjected to financial rationalities, where financial 
assets are coproduced by ordinary people ‘who in the course of 
social reproduction find themselves making increasing numbers 
of contractual payments ... and by the financiers who perform the 
technical work of turning these payments into fungible risk 
assets’ (Christophers 2016: 8). Surplus-value arises as the amount 
paid by waged workers for risk absorption ‘bears no necessary 
relation to the value of the financial risk we crystallise ... it 
depends on conditions in the market for our risk-generative 
capacity’ (Ibid: 9). Such an approach can equip us to ask, how do 
individuals and households position themselves vis-à-vis finance 
capital with respect to the shifting of risks and rewards in a 
manner that enables the extraction of surplus value? 
 
While the ceaseless vitalism of capital envisaged by Marxist 
theories of biocapitalism and financialisation have little to 
regarding the ecological and biophysical limits encountered by 
unlimited capitalist expansion, their illumination of contemporary 
transformations of labour and value problematize the clear 
dialectic that Moore sets up between appropriative and 
exploitative processes. By synthesising ecological, Autonomist, 
and financially-oriented Marxist value-theory, we can develop a 
better picture of how financialised capitalism deepens and 
extends commodity frontiers, and the socio-ecological outcomes 
thereof. 
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1.3 Towards a world-ecological politics: state theory 
and the ‘constitutive outside’  
 
The world-ecological approach provides important contexture 
for the global, ecological, value-relational context of the 
operations of technical systems in mediating the coproduction of 
human and extra-human natures. Its explicit focus on ‘world-
ecological agencies’, however, loses texture in micro and meso-
level analysis that accounts for how technics actually operate, and 
in particular how they affect and are affected by the structure-
agency problematic.3 Consequently, it has been charged with 
lacking an actionable theory of political action. This final section 
considers Marxist engagements with state theory and local 
economies to provide guidance for an empirical analysis that 
identifies how world-ecological value-relations percolate in and 
through sub-world-systemic actors.  
 
Synthesising the insights of his predecessors, most pertinently 
Gramsci, Poulantzas and Milliband, Bob Jessop’s (2016) 
‘strategic-relational approach’ (SRA) provides a useful 
methodology for conducting Marxist state analysis. The SRA 
understands the state-system as a social relation that reflects the 
balance of forces prevalent within a social formation, but also 
inscribed with ‘strategic selectivity’, meaning that (a) its capacity 
to shape certain outcomes faces in-built biases privileging 
particular agents whose position is determined through path-
dependence, and (b) that the effects of state power create 
differential (rather than absolute) constraints and opportunities 
for different agents. The state-system’s formal separation from 
                                                      
3 This criticism was pre-empted by Arrighi (1994) himself, who noted 
that “our analytical construct [world-systemic cycles of accumulation] 
…  offers a limited view of what goes on in the middle layer of market 
economy and the bottom layer of material life. This is simultaneously 
the main strength and the main weakness of the construct” (Arrighi 
1994: 25-26). 
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the capital relation, enabling it to exert extra-economic force to 
ensure preconditions for accumulation are achieved, also enables 
it to exert institutional power in ways that may be highly 
dysfunctional for capital accumulation (Jessop 2016: 189-210). Its 
organisational coherence and functional coordination cannot 
thus be pre-given but is the product of state projects that affect its 
institutional structures. Similarly, its capacity to promote forms of 
economic development and maintain legitimacy is also highly 
contingent, and emerges through state strategies, i.e. forms of 
socio-economic (and we may add, ecological) intervention. In the 
financialised contemporary global economy, the state-system has 
turned away from governance and increasingly to 
governmentality and meta-governance in pursuing its strategies 
and projects, with the effect of depoliticising decisions of 
production, circulation, distribution and consumption through 
their delegation, privatisation and denial.4 This has had the 
general effect of increasing the operating space available to 
financial capital within the state-system, by forcing governing 
parties to recourse to ‘fast policy’ and frequent regulatory 
withdrawal in order to keep up with the compressed temporality 
of financial cycles (Holloway 1994).  
 
Pertinent to the world-ecological project, the state-system has 
been recently characterised as an ‘ecological’ or ‘technological’ 
regime by political ecologists and resource geographers. For these 
scholars, the state-system plays an important role as ‘socio-
ecological membrane’: through its functions as the instantiator of 
a place-based property regime (and therefore as landlord of last 
resort), by producing and maintaining infrastructure crucial for 
capitalism’s reproduction, by regulating the conditions for market 
creation and operation, and by engendering the knowledge-based 
practices that make biophysical reality economically legible and 
accessible (Parenti 2015; Andreucci et al. 2017). State-systems as 
                                                      
4 With respect to such ecological regulationary mechanisms reflecting 
these processes, see: Bryant, G 2016. 
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‘ecological regimes’ must negotiate two sets of contradictions. 
The first relates to managing the consequences of the 
degradation of conditions of production (consequences of 
O’Connor’s second contradiction) for capital, labour, and the wider 
public while maintaining its own fiscal stability and credibility as 
governing body (Castree 2008). The second, described as the 
‘climate dialectic’, arises internal to the complexity of consequent 
state regulatory actions, leading to dysfunctionality and 
inadequate management of economic-environmental 
contradictions, with the result of either regime change or system 
transformation as well as the growth of the state’s interventionist 
role (Goodman 2016). The consequent ‘fixes’ preferred by states 
in the neoliberal mold are to either address contradictions 
internal to the state by off-loading responsibilities to the private 
sector and/or civil society groups, or otherwise to avoid internal 
contradictions altogether by adopting a ‘minimal state’ stance. In 
performing these multiple often-conflicting roles, the state-
system necessarily operates with similarly contradictory ecological 
and financial value frameworks. Thus, to resolve the ecological 
contradictions of capital, the state is required to call on 
information from outside capital, from science and law, and to 
translate between their distinct logics (Robertson & Wainwright 
2013). 
 
Human geographers have foregrounded the spatiality of these 
processes, with the implication of the uneven distribution of 
energy outcomes, the co-existence of multiple energy transition 
pathways existing at different governmental and organisational 
scales, and the geographic results of the creative and destructive 
consequences of energy transition (Brenner 2004). The 
territoriality of energy infrastructure networks have thus been 
assessed in terms of their contiguity (dispersion/density), 
connectivity, and centralisation (Hess 2004). As Bridge et al. 
summarise, the question of a desirable energy transition is one 
which turns upon ‘fundamentally a geographical project: it not 
only requires societies to commit massive investment to redesign 
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infrastructure, buildings, and equipment, but also to make 
choices from a range of possible spatial solutions and scales of 
governance’ (Bridge et al 2013: 332). Here again the state plays an 
important role in regulating the ‘territoriality’ of energy regimes, 
most pertinently through overseeing the construction and 
maintenance of infrastructural technologies that distribute energy 
between generators and consumers. To this end, the state-system 
has been shown to be predisposed historically to facilitating 
centralised and capital-intensive fossil-fuel energy projects 
(Mitchell 2011).  
 
J.K. Gibson-Graham’s (2006a, 2006b, 2015) project of querying 
the nascent ‘capitalocentrism’ of Marxist political economy 
provides conceptual and methodological resources to read 
difference into societies characterised by capitalist value-relations. 
In doing so, they shed light upon the virtually unlimited 
noncapitalist activities that co-constitute the same socio-
economic space seen by Marxists through the value-relational 
lens as subservient to capitalist production (2006b: 70-74). Theirs 
is thus a ‘flat’ political-economic ontology, which avers 
structuralist vertical models. Against the appropriation-
exploitation dialectic of Moore, then, which further invigorates 
the ‘leviathan that swallows its neighbours and cohabitants’, 
internalising most productive activities into the same capitalist 
world-ecological system, Gibson-Graham seek to reveal the 
‘constitutive outside’ of capitalism (2006a: xxiii-xxiv). 
Acknowledging the difficulty faced by horizontalists such as the 
Italian Autonomists before them, Gibson-Graham suggest the 
concept of ‘community economy’ as a ‘new nodal point [around 
which] an alternative fixing of economic identity’ may cohere 
into a counterhegemonic politics (2006b: 78). Constructing 
community economies entails acknowledging the diverse socio-
economic needs and already-existing institutions specific to 
communities, and proposing models of transactions, labour, and 
enterprises that are noncapitalist - i.e. communal, independent - 
that can address them (2006b: 169-175). Another major 
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departure from Marxist orthodoxy is their incorporation of 
subjectivity, arguing ‘the process of subject formation is key to 
any political project, especially if collective action is to take place’, 
and strategies of ‘resubjectification’ that enable subjects to release 
themselves from their allegiance to capitalist identities (2016: 11). 
While their methodological demand to ‘perform diverse 
economies’ is not entirely taken up here, it nevertheless motivates 
consideration of the ambivalent role played by household and 
community energy projects vis-a-vis capitalist energy sectors.  
 
*** 
 
World-ecology critically engages with energy transition as a 
capitalist project of ‘ecological revolution’ ensuring the 
conditions for ongoing capital accumulation amidst amplifying 
negative socio-ecological feedback. Despite its focus on the 
world-system and ‘territorial agencies’, there is no coherent 
singular agency of capital; such projects to extend and deepen 
the commodity and appropriation frontier occur through a 
rather ill-defined technicity, altering the nature of labour as well 
as the technologies available to us. Clearly, the state still plays a 
critical role in mediating these processes, as do, increasingly, 
financial markets and instruments. As we experience an 
accelerating global energy transition, is there a place for the kind 
of localist political economy described by Gibson-Graham 
amidst such imposing techno-politics? In the next chapter, we 
turn to interrogate this question more deeply by way of the 
history of economic and philosophical approaches to technicity 
and energy transition.   
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Chapter 2. Critical Theories of Technicity 
and Energy Transition 
 
This chapter presents three engagements with technicity that 
develop the world-ecological approach around energy transition. 
The first considers socio-technical systems theory (STS), the 
prevailing neo-Schumpeterian approach to energy transition, 
and its predecessors in evolutionary economics of innovation 
(EEI) and economics of technology change (ETC), via their 
common origins with world-systems theorists in the study of 
Kondratieff long-waves. The second considers anthropologies 
of energy, which proves more attendant to the micro-politics 
and social significance of energy technologies, infrastructures 
and discourses, creating space for localised and potentially 
counterhegemonic materially-discursively informed politics. The 
final engagement considered is philosophical, providing the 
insight that technology must be relational, consisting of a 
bounded openness to radical recuperation – tools that privilege 
value-generating processes insofar as they emerge from capitalist 
research programs, yet capable of being turned toward non-
capitalist social relations within the appropriate political milieu.  
 
2.1 Schumpeterian and Marxist precursors 
 
Economic accounts of technological development originate in 
the study of ‘long-waves’ developed by Nikolai Kondratieff, 
who observed a historical record of long-term cyclical rises and 
falls in the values of economic price indicators (Kondratieff 
1935: 105). For Kondratieff, their regularity implied an 
endogenous cause, refuting that neither changes in technique 
nor wars, revolutions or the expansion of the world economy’s 
frontiers were the primary determinants of long-waves (Ibid: 
112). Nevertheless, the study of long-waves stimulated a 
protracted debate regarding their causal origins, between 
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entrepreneurial-technology-innovation-centric (Schumpeterian) 
models, and capital-accumulation-centric (Marxist) models.  
 
Marxist accounts have emphasised the contradictions of capital 
in explaining the technological changes attendant to the 
Kondratieff long-term cyclical dynamic. Marx’s analysis focused 
on the labour-saving dimension of technical change, which - 
notwithstanding Moore’s addition of the appropriation dynamic 
- linked increased labour productivity to increased capitalisation 
(Elster 1983: 177-179). Understood through a class-analytic lens, 
technological change is an induced substitution responding to 
declines in profitability stemming from wage-level increases 
(Rosenberg 1969, 1976). Ernest Mandel (1964, 1980) applied 
this framework to the study of long-waves, suggesting that 
decisive victories of capital over labour in class struggle open 
new avenues for profitable accumulation thereby enabling 
greater investment and utilisation of technical possibilities 
previously possible but unfeasible, generating a long-wave 
upswing, while growing working class strength alongside 
building capital intensity reduce the average rate of profit and 
collapse investor confidence, thereby generating a long-wave 
downswing. For Mandel, while accepting that ‘innovations 
inevitably result from the very operation of the [capitalist] 
system’, interrogating their determinants discovers ‘material 
rewards, social (ideological) pressure and specific institutions 
such as transformation of the system of higher education; 
systematic organisation of scientific research; development of 
the so-called applied sciences; increasing autonomisation and 
profitability of research activities…’ at the heart of technologies 
developed in capitalist societies (Mandel 1993: 323). 
 
Schumpeterian accounts have charged the Marxist explanation 
for minimising the role of institutional measures, taken by states 
and firms alike to reduce the uncertainties inherent to 
innovation, which encouraged the experimentation that made 
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innovation commonplace (Rosenberg 1994: 93-97).5 
Schumpeter’s mature theory of ‘creative destruction’, referring 
to the endogenous processes of new technical combinations 
that incessantly revolutionised the economic structure, set the 
agenda for the Evolutionary Economics of Innovation and the 
Economics of Technological Change (ETC) (Schumpeter 1943). 
Prominent neo-Schumpeterian Carlota Perez introduced 
‘technological styles’ as a ‘paradigm for the most efficient 
organisation of production, i.e. the main form and direction 
along which productivity growth takes place within and across 
firms, industries and countries’ (Perez 1983: 363). She suggests 
that techno-economic subsystems only contingently coexist with 
the social-institutional framework within which they are 
embedded, and relative degrees of mismatch between the two 
lead to differing kinds of crises, forcing either restructuring of 
the socio-institutional framework to facilitate innovations 
complementary to the emergent style (an upswing crisis) or 
blocks to the diffusion of the new style leading to social-political 
crisis (downswing crisis) (Tylecote 1993: 19-22).  
 
Long-wave theorists typically understand the role of energy vis-
à-vis particular fuels as ‘key factors’ that enable major advances 
in the potential productivity across economic sectors, which 
typically fulfil the criteria that they are (a) perceived to  have a 
low and rapidly falling relative cost, (b) with an apparently 
almost unlimited availability of supply over long periods, (c) 
with clear potential for its incorporation in many products and 
processes throughout the economic system (Freeman and Perez, 
1988: 48). Utilising a model of global energy shifts that 
incorporates geopolitical rivalry, commercial competition and 
social unrest as key determinants, Podobnik’s account notably 
                                                      
5 Emphasising initially the independent progression of scientific 
research as the primary dynamic driver (Schumpeter 1934) and later 
the role of large corporations in influencing the diffusion of new 
technologies (Schumpeter 1939). 
34 
provides a synthesised account that acknowledges the critical 
role of civil social movements in steering the global energy 
regime away from nuclear energy during the 1980s. (Podobnik 
1999: 158). 
 
2.2 Sociotechnical systems theory: a critical review  
 
STS emerged at the convergence EEI and ETC in the neo-
Schumpeterian heterodoxy. Its core progenitors utilise a 
Kuhnian category-idealist methodology, centralising the study of 
‘technological regimes’ (i.e. paradigms), which refer to the 
research heuristics of engineers and, more broadly, the rule-set 
that guides innovators and commercial developer’s actions 
involved in technical development (Nelson and Winter 1977, 
1982; Rip and Kemp 1998). Transformation of such regimes 
thus depends upon change in its constitutive rules, and radical 
innovations are those which effectuate such an outcome.  Its 
transition theory aims to describe and understand how 
technological innovation, considered desirable for more 
sustainable societies, are either resisted or established (Markard 
et al 2012). It introduces the ‘multi-level perspective’, which 
envisages successful innovations as emerging from small niches 
and moving toward wider applications, thus reconfiguring the 
socio-technical regime. At the micro-level, it envisages ‘niches’ 
within which innovations emerge as experiments in relatively 
protected spaces, at the meso-level, ‘regimes’ exist, which 
consist of networks of actors, guiding rules and material and 
technical elements, while at the macro-level, ‘landscapes’ 
predominate, which describe the slow-changing factors that 
influence a variety of regimes (Grin et al 2010). When ‘external 
factors’ come to bear increasing pressure on a socio-technical 
regime, STS envisages a reorientation of social actor-networks, 
potentially sufficiently destabilised to see widespread 
dealignment, before becoming reinstitutionalised upon new 
‘sustainable’ technological innovations (Verbong and Geels 
2012). Its ontology thereby rests upon an uneasy dualism 
35 
between a thickly descriptive account of micro- and meso- 
actor-network processes, while externalising and bracketing out 
the ‘slow-changing’ cultural-structural factors that constitute a 
sociotechnical regime ‘landscape’. 
 
Questions of governance are characterised as problems of 
‘strategic niche management’ and ‘transition management’ 
through the protection of budding innovation programs prior to 
their exposure to competitive forces (Rotmans & Kemp 2008). 
In approaching energy sector shift, however, STS has typically 
promoted market liberalisation as the most critical external 
stimulus to the system in effectuating ‘radical innovation’, 
thereby enabling ‘a general broadening of innovation routes’  
(Markard & Truffler 2006, 2008).6 In the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis, its scholars have attributed the collapse of ‘green 
financing’ to government policy withdrawal and consequent 
lacking investor confidence, yet propose deepening 
infrastructure privatisation as solution to ongoing policy 
deadlock (Geels 2013: 93). Whilst much of the post-crisis 
literature considered the conditions necessary for reinvigorating 
innovation, relatively little analysis has considered  what 
conditions are needed to enable already-existing technologies to 
break the deadlock of the present sociotechnical system (Arranz 
2017: 125). Concerned primarily with economic drivers such as 
subsidies and price as key to regime destabilisation (and only 
mediated by extra-economic factors), STS scarcely considers the 
factors cohering to produce resistance – factors which are 
consigned to the ideologies stemming from the intentional 
landscape. To this end, Arranz notes that it is only ‘regime 
outsiders with both a radical (enough) ideology and influence 
                                                      
6 The same authors nevertheless acknowledge that laissez-faire 
governance models have not transformed utilities’ underlying 
investment behaviour, such that ‘generation technologies, network 
structures, power consuming appliances, etc. have not much changed 
since the beginning of liberalisation’.  
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over economic factors [that] can destabilise the energy sector’, a 
finding that, despite its idealism, demonstrates the necessity of 
studying the societal aspects of destabilisation (Arranz 2017: 
139).  
 
The chief difference between neo-Marxist and neo-
Schumpeterian perspectives on techno-economic change turns 
upon the endogeneity of politics in the analytic treatment. For 
STS, politics is typically understood as an epiphenomenon of an 
autonomous techno-economic trajectory, while for the neo-
Marxist perspective, politics-culture is constitutive of techno-
economic change through, for example, spatio-temporal fixes 
and modes of regularisation-societalisation that structure the 
political-economic space (Tyfield 2014: 109-112). Moreover, as 
Antonelli argues, ‘consistently with the dominant view that 
technological change is exogenous … very little attention has 
been paid to the analysis of the determinants of innovation’ 
(Antonelli 2011: 29). STS’s theoretical framework inherits from 
Schumpeter an assumption about the spontaneity and autonomy 
of innovation without querying the social presuppositions of a 
systemic subjective drive across all economic life to innovate. 
Preferring to see how new technologies fire the imagination of 
prospective entrepreneurs, STS tends to ignore the material 
social context; such as the role played by capitalist value-
relations in enabling the dominance of certain social relations. 
Rather than interrogating the supposed benefit of emerging 
technical paradigms, STS tends to focus on providing policy 
advice to minimise the economic problems caused by the 
techno-economic cycle’s ‘creative destruction’, such as through 
‘adaptive regulation’ to restrain its excesses.  
 
Gailing and Moss (2016) summarise the critiques levelled at 
STS’s transition theory, concerning its oversimplification or 
exclusion of: (a) the dynamic/relational nature of the 
institutional context, (b) the hybridity of materiality and 
sociality, (c) critical analysis of the power dynamics influencing 
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agency and structure, and (d) the significance of the spatial (and 
scalar) context. To this end, they argue that transition literature 
tends to assume that innovators pursue only, or primarily, 
environmentally responsible interests, and ignore inequalities 
and the conflicts generated by energy transitions. However, as 
they counter,  
 
Power is constitutive to the discourses, actor constellations, 
decision-making processes and consequences of 
sociotechnical transitions. Energy transitions, it follows, are 
inherently political: they are often subject to narrow 
interests, prone to unequal impacts and politically contested. 
They can transform institutional and governance 
arrangements, but they can also reinforce existing power 
relations. There is a need, therefore, to seek ways of 
conceptualising power in energy transitions which goes 
beyond simplistic notions of individuals having or not 
having power, entering instead a relational understanding of 
how power gets collectively produced and inscribed in new 
sociotechnical configurations. (Gailing & Moss 2016: 32) 
 
In response, Gailing and Bues (2016) primarily use the post-
structuralist Foucauldian notions of ‘governmentality’ and 
‘depoliticisation’ as key concepts for elucidating power relations 
in their study of the German energy transition. They also engage 
Marxist political ecology (MPE), whose metabolic conceptual 
framework provides the best toolbox for understanding ‘the 
permanent flux in the contested making of capitalist 
socionatural network arrangements’ (Moss et al 2016: 58). The 
Socioecological metabolic framework provides a bridge between 
post-structuralist Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) methodologies, 
associated with human/nonhuman assemblages of power 
relations, and spatial political economy.7 Energy systems play 
                                                      
7 For a pertinent application of this methodology to the study of 
human/extra-human agency in electricity grids, see: Bennett, J 2010, 
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central roles in regulating these metabolic processes, and MPE’s 
accounting of its different sociomaterial components can follow 
the ANT assemblage methodology, considering, for example, 
the ‘physical energy structures, flows of electrons, gas molecules 
and steam, human workers, wind turbines, nuclear breeder 
reactors or coal-fired plants, firms and customers, inflows and 
outflows of money, energy and matter…’, while nevertheless 
accentuating the conflicts that come from political-economic 
decision making, a major lacuna in the STS framework (Ibid: 
60). Synthesising the two approaches, MPE’s radical critique of 
capitalism overcomes ANT’s ‘flat’ constructivist approach whilst 
remaining attentive to ontologies that consider also the agency 
of non-human infrastructural actants and governmental modes 
of power. Nevertheless, despite their engagement with MPE’s 
metabolic metaphor, Moss, Gailing & Becker’s illuminating 
work eschews a class or value-theoretic analysis – something 
that may be rectified by the contextual use of world-ecology. 
 
2.3 Anthropology of energy technologies 
 
The anthropological study of infrastructure, utilising ANT 
methodology, has emphasised the materiality and spatiality of 
public energy infrastructures and their attendant social 
significances. Where STS writers (i.e. Helm 2011) propose the 
relative attractiveness of stable incomes deriving from 
infrastructure investment for capital during financial uncertainty, 
critical energy anthropologists have illustrated the paradoxes 
facing contemporary infrastructure planning, including those of 
‘ruin’, ‘retrofit’ and ‘risk’ (Howe et al 2015). They write, 
‘infrastructures, paradoxically, both mitigate and magnify 
precarity in the anthropocene’; while they are built to mitigate 
risk, they frequently introduces new risks, namely the amplified 
and cascading consequences to the collapse of nested and 
                                                                                                        
‘The Agency of Assemblages’, Vibrant Matter, Duke University Press, 
London, UK. 
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sophisticated infrastructural systems. Additionally, just as 
overabundant, unevenly distributed and maintained 
infrastructures ‘become imbalanced in their installation, so too 
have climatological consequences been disproportionately felt’, 
such that old ‘predict and provide’ models that result in 
expanding infrastructural capacities to meet increasing demand 
are no longer environmentally, economically, or politically 
desirable (Ibid: 12). Speculative torrents of finance capital 
exacerbate this tendency of technical systems such as energy 
infrastructure toward amplifying instability. Moreover, 
financialisation also amplifies inequalities in benefits received 
from the ownership of public goods, which sees ‘key decisions 
relating to infrastructure investment increasingly being made by a 
tiny elite of fund managers… [biasing] energy investment against 
projects which benefit the poor, are sensitive to local needs, and 
are less carbon intensive’ (The Platform Collective 2016: 222).  
 
The mobilisation of an existentially-charged discourse of ‘risk’, 
‘energy security’ and the ‘securitisation’ of energy infrastructures 
as a policy objective has been shown to play a critical role in 
contemporary governance of energy transition (Bridge et al. 
2015). Evoking concerns about the collapsing conditions of life, 
securitisation ‘licenses renewed state oversight of, and 
involvement in, decisions about the production, transportation 
and consumption of energy in countries … where the state has 
historically unwound itself from ownership and administration of 
the energy system’ (Bridge 2015: 330). Initially invoked by 
Western governments in response to the OPEC-induced oil crisis 
of the 1970s, ‘energy security’ resurfaced as a key concern during 
the 2007-08 oil price increases, at a time when fossil-fuel 
extraction rates are beginning to reach real geophysical limits 
(The Platform Collective 2016: 212). Moreover, the concept has 
demonstrated elasticity of application, recently used to legitimate 
neo-Colonial land acquisitions for large-scale renewable energy 
projects (Hamouchene 2016). It can thus be understood as a 
discursive strategy of final appeal, invoked to override other 
40 
concerns for fear of losing energy control, evocative of the 
collapsing conditions for life associated in the era of climate-
change. Additionally, the mobilisation of discourses around ‘risk’, 
particularly in the mining sector, have also been critically 
determinant in legitimating state projects of regulatory 
withdrawal during the neoliberal era (Emel & Huber 2008: 1394). 
Insofar as what comes to constitute ‘risk’ is subject to social 
contestation, those agents better equipped to measure and 
manipulate the prevailing model of risk tend to dominate the 
balance of power over such projects (Ibid: 1397). As global 
financial market analysts have come to monopolise and mobilised 
the most sophisticated instruments of risk-calculation, the task of 
governing such risk is increasingly outsourced to such 
intermediaries, and away from centralised state-systems.  
 
Boyer’s introduction of ‘energopolitics’ and its application to 
‘revolutionary infrastructures’ reveals the role played by energy 
grid infrastructure in mediating potentially disruptive socio-
ecological relations (Boyer 2014 and 2017). Infrastructures of 
vast temporality and scale are essentially reproductive, providing 
an ‘inertial force’ designed to facilitate flows and enable other 
social processes to happen. This also complicates the process of 
retrofitting or total reconstruction in order to avert catastrophe, 
reinforcing the centralised political-economic forces that 
produced them and continue capitalising from the commodity 
flows they enable. On the other hand, infrastructure is enabling, 
and by extension, revolutionary - it ‘stores the productive 
energies of labour (mental, material, natural) in such a way that 
they can be released later in magnitudes that appear to transcend 
normal inputs’, thus able to sustain entirely alternate social 
arrangements (Boyer 2017: 5).8  
 
                                                      
8 Lenin’s famous aphorism that ‘communism is Soviet power plus the 
electrification of the whole country’ is pertinent (Lenin 1920). 
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Hermann Scheer, architect of the German energy transition, 
popularised the notion of a municipalised ‘solar economy’, 
which considers the critical importance of democratised social 
relations in securing the clean energy transition. Contrasted with 
fossil fuels, the generation of renewable energies can occur in 
potentially infinite number of places, where they must be 
harvested by localised technical means (Scheer 2007: 19). While 
the historic separation of energy production and consumption 
has created a steadily growing transmission infrastructure whose 
associated costs have steadily grown, he argues that modularised 
and decentralised generation guarantees security of supply and 
costing, since capital investment would not be affected by 
fluctuations in energy prices, and investments could be made on 
the basis of demand (Ibid: 22). In the German transition, the 
state-instituted feed-in-tariff, synergising with the burgeoning 
waves of information-technologies, was the single most 
effective policy instrument in accelerating decentralised 
renewable energy production, ‘erod[ing] the foundations of the 
ever-expanding networks of corporate power that the energy 
supply chains made possible’, despite concerted resistance from 
electricity utilities and the fossil fuel industry (Scheer 2002: 204). 
Such an erosion made possible publicly municipalising energy 
transmission across multiple provinces, safeguarding general 
energy supply while subsidising those left paying the rising costs 
for the upkeep of the system. Boyer claims: 
 
Proliferating decentralised small-scale is our revolutionary 
path forward. Urban spaces and municipal politics - blending 
as they do relatively small spaces with relatively dense 
humanity - will thus become especially critical zones of 
experiment, engagement and transformation [and will allow] 
for more efficient and decentralised short supply chains that 
are also more susceptible to democratic political control. 
(Boyer 2017: 15) 
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The revolutionary ‘energopolitics’ made possible by energy 
technologies and infrastructures endorsed by Boyer provides a 
pertinent example of how technicity can be reconsidered in a 
more relational fashion. ‘Revolution’ need not be the only 
mobilisation of such a relational technicity. Karen Pinkus 
challenges the statist instrumentalisation of decentralised energy 
infrastructure to ensure grid functionality, envisaging instead an 
autonomous engagement, ‘perhaps disruptive, violent, 
effervescent, generous, or altruistic - [but above all] not dictated 
by the assumption that [grid] intermittency equals death’ (Pinkus 
2017: 341). Behind approaches such as Boyer’s and Pinkus’ lies 
a more playful orientation to technicity than is offered by Moore 
(2015). The final section of this chapter proposes how such a 
relational ontology can overcome the limitations of world-
ecology’s technological determinism. 
 
2.4 The ‘bounded relationality’ of technicity 
 
While the world-ecology framework has strived to incorporate a 
relational ontology to ecological political economy, it has 
nevertheless treated ‘capitalist’ technics as an instrumentalising 
and monolithic assemblage of processes, ‘crucial to successive 
reimaginings of global nature as a warehouse of free gifts’ 
(Moore 2015: 152). To this end, while acknowledging the 
ultimate functioning of such technics as ‘a cascading series of 
contingent but also quasi-determined and ‘teleconnected’ process’, 
Moore nevertheless succumbs to a technological determinism 
characteristic of modernist Marxist prioritisation of forces of 
production as drivers of history (Ibid, footnote 34). Critical 
theories of history, from within and without the Marxist lineage, 
have sought to provide more dialectical engagements with 
technology as something at once embodying a social collectivity 
and boundedly open to recuperation for emancipatory purposes.  
 
Marx’s ‘Fragment on the Machine’ has provided a critical tool 
for theorists proposing an emancipatory orientation to 
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technology, most notably through the concept of the ‘general 
intellect’ (Hardt & Negri 2004; see also section 1.2.2). Unlike the 
STS perspective, which divorces technology from the social 
relations underpinning it, historian of technology - and critical 
reference for Moore - Lewis Mumford suggests that modern 
technics have, ‘produced a collective economy and its typical 
products are collective products… the work represents a 
collaboration of innumerable workers, themselves utilising a 
large and ramifying technical heritage’ (Ibid 354-355). Seeking to 
dispel the anti-humanist tendency within technologists’ accounts 
of technological change, Mumford writes that 
  
Because of their independent source of power, and their 
semioperatic operation… machines have seemed to have a 
reality and an independent existence apart from the user… 
[and yet] from the beginning, the most durable conquests of 
the machine lay not in the instruments of themselves… but 
in the modes of life made possible via the machine and in 
the machine. (Mumford 1934: 322-323) 
 
French philosopher Gilbert Simondon’s theory of ontogenesis 
elucidates the becoming of individuals as relational entities, and 
understood technics as a key locus of ontogenesis in modern 
socio-economic life. Technics are ‘a relational process of 
circumstantial creation and innovation wherein concrete 
machines are complex and dialogic with their environments, 
including their human ones’ (Simondon quoted in Letiche & 
Moriceau 2017: 4). The individual technical object is invented 
only through the emergence of a circular causality, wherein two 
sets of potentials synergise to form a single continuous system, 
which operates in a semi-automatic fashion. The two previously 
discontinuous technical elements, which presuppose a ‘pre-
individual milieu’, are thus recomposed into a new technical 
individual, which exists with a degree of operational autonomy 
from its conditions of creation (Massumi 2012: 32). This 
emergent birth is the moment of ontogenesis, and it is 
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continually ongoing at the interface between environments and 
technologies, granting technical objects a synergetic nature 
(Simondon 2016: 11). The designer’s role in this process is 
robbed of the heroic brilliance of Schumpeter’s account, and 
reduced to that of bringing the two disparate elements close 
enough together that they cross the threshold into continuous 
individuality autonomously; ‘the designer is a helpmate to 
emergence’ (Massumi 2012: 26).  
 
Beside Marx’s account of socio-economic alienation, Simondon 
also understood alienation to exist as a physical-psychological 
process, one which prevents ‘the continuity between the human 
individual and the technical individual’ (Simondon 2016: 117-
118). To this end, the development of a ‘technical mentality’ (or 
culture) appropriate to the post-industrial age was a critical 
concern for Simondon, who recognised the possibility of such 
an outcome through the emergence of technics that facilitate 
networked and participatory communities (Combes 2013: 57-
60). The post-industrial technical object was presciently 
understood by Simondon to be a fusion of two layers of reality, 
one stable, permanent, and adhering to the user, while another 
was modular, impersonal, and mass-produced by industry (Lotti 
2015: 30). Such technologies provide tools with which a 
technical commons may be reinvigorated, ‘to be achieved in 
cooperation with technologies rather than in antagonism or 
separation’ (Ibid: 34). Moreover, as technical objects undergo 
individuation in and through the transformation of their 
associated milieu, they necessarily alter also the environment in 
which they operate; reconstituting existing communities by the 
creation of a new functionality, ‘modif[ying] collective values 
and beliefs on the basis of [technics’] internal design, thereby … 
impacting collective and psychic individuation’ (Ibid: 30). In 
ontologically grounding energy infrastructure in a relational 
manner, Brian Larkin suggests that 
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Infrastructures are matter that enable the movement of 
other matter. Their peculiar ontology lies in the facts that 
they are things and also the relation between things ... they 
are objects that create the grounds on which other objects 
operate, and when they do so they operate as systems. 
(Larkin 2013: 329) 
 
The radical openness of such a concept of technical ensembles 
such as infrastructures must be tempered by an opposing 
assessment of the value-relation within which they are situated 
and from which they arise. Bernard Stiegler investigated how 
technical systems are mediated through the socio-economic 
system, suggesting that the latter’s sub-system of prices and its 
organisation of production determine the economic interest of 
any particular technique, whose relevance is determined by 
innovators, who understand and seek to disrupt the rules of 
socialisation according to the material reward thereby gained: 
‘the logic of innovation is constituted by the rules of adjustment 
between the technical system and the others’ (Stiegler 1998: 37). 
Critically, this mediation is qualitatively altered by the 
financialisation of economic organisation, which conditions the 
nature of innovation by subjecting it to the availability of highly 
mobile capital, whose accelerated liquidity engenders a new 
relation of technicity to time, one of ‘intensified and permanent 
innovation’ (Ibid: 38-41). The commercialisation of R&D 
departments penetrates their research orientations with 
industrial-economic considerations, and the consequent 
quickening of innovation turnover further threatens to amplify 
cross-domain instabilities, as ‘at a rhythm of constant 
innovation, unknown factors are no longer possible; the 
movement must be controlled at the risk of collapsing the global 
coherence of complementary systems operation’ (Ibid: 43). The 
development of state-based technostructures, which may 
regulate the transfer processes within and between the 
technological and socio-economic systems, has been a central 
response to this threat.  
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Marxian philosopher Andrew Feenberg looks to Marcuse (1960, 
1961) in critically responding to constructivist science and 
technology studies which have illustrated the interpretative 
flexibility to which technologies are subject, seeing their ultimate 
functionality as indeterminate and often in dispute (Feenberg 
2010: 15). Nevertheless, such approaches neglect the role of 
‘technological hegemony’, which asserts itself through ‘technical 
codes’, i.e. the criteria that select ‘between alternative feasible 
technical designs in terms of a social goal and realise that goal in 
design’, with specific reference to technological rationality 
incorporated into the structure of machines (Ibid 17: 68). 
Through the incorporation of ‘technological rationality’, objects 
become divorced from their rich social embeddedness and are 
reduced/simplified to bring to prominence their functionalised 
aspect – within capitalist societies this process is intensified to 
facilitate commodification (Ibid: 208-212). Nevertheless, the 
products of commodity-oriented innovation must always be 
recontextualised into diverse social meanings when they are 
implemented by social users. In post-Fordist modernity, where 
networked communicative technologies suffuse social relations, 
rationalisation no longer stands opposed to culture as such but 
appears as a creative expression of it. Hence Feenberg writes, 
‘the poverty of the actual techno-culture must be traced not to 
the essence of technology but to other aspects of our society 
such as the economic forces that dominate technical 
development’ (Ibid: 155).  
 
*** 
 
This chapter engaged the world-ecological framework with 
Schumpeterian, anthropological, and critical philosophical 
theories of technicity to provoke a more fruitful analysis of the 
conditions in which technologies facilitate or resist the 
extension and intensification of the capitalist value-relation. It 
considered the prevailing theory of energy transition, STS, in the 
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light of its Schumpeterian methodological basis, critiqued for 
lacking an interrogation of how capitalist power-relations 
determine the dynamics of innovation that it promotes. By 
considering the social collectivity inherent to technical systems 
alongside their embeddedness within capitalist systems of 
innovation, a dynamic model of technicity is developed in order 
to be applied to the case-study of DERs in the final chapter. 
Before then, the next chapter considers the present conjunction 
of energy transition and crisis in Australia through the world-
ecological framework.  
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Chapter 3. Cheap Energy in Australia: 
History and Crisis 
 
The urgency of discourse about energy transition today must be 
situated within prevailing concerns about the contemporaneous 
‘energy crisis’. This chapter reveals the current conjuncture in 
the power relations and political economy of this crisis as 
convergent between energy, climate and capital. Insofar as 
world-ecology emphasises the socio-ecological path-dependence 
of technical expansions of the commodity frontier, we first trace 
a history of Cheap Energy through the capital-state-techne 
nexus in Australia vis-a-vis the world-system. We consider how 
capital-intensive fossil-fuel extraction projects, and their vast 
attendant transmission infrastructures, have effectuated 
centralised governing bodies and coalitional power blocs with 
preferential strategic selectivity for energy industry capital. The 
deleterious socio-ecological consequences of this coalition have 
surfaced during the neoliberal era, when the privatisation and 
financialisation of energy infrastructure has removed the buffer 
of public-interest oriented policy. The triple crisis is explored 
through the accumulation of ‘negative-value’: extreme weather 
events, rising temperatures, and risky transmission infrastructure 
materially underpinning an electricity market exposed to volatile 
financial markets. In this context, the state-system is caught in a 
growing ‘climate dialectic’ that has increasingly come to 
politicise energy, as demonstrated by its highly contradictory 
responses to the 2016 South Australia blackout event. 
 
3.1 The historic financialisation of Cheap Energy in 
Australia 
 
This history considers the recent history of Australian Cheap 
Energy and its erosion with financialisation in the neoliberal era. 
It focuses upon the role played by the world-systemic power 
blocs between transnational industry and financial capital and 
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the state-system, with emphasis upon the latter’s use of strategic 
projects, manifested through mobilisation of particular 
discourses, the sponsoring of technological diffusion and the 
production and regulation of infrastructure.  
 
The Coal-State Nexus and the World-System   
 
The coal-mining industry in Australia fostered a close relation 
with the state-system, combining its activities with a state-
sponsored ethos of frontier development and nation-building. 
Throughout Australia’s history from early colonial outpost to 
modern neoliberalised state, the state has operated to facilitate 
the expansion of coal mining particularly through its functions 
as landowner, infrastructure developer, subsidiser of new 
technologies, and regulator of energy markets. During its 
colonial period, this was primarily oriented to the maintenance 
of steady energy flows for the British empire, and much later 
directed to Japanese post-war reconstruction, and was thereby 
export-oriented from its inception (Richmond & Sharma 1983; 
Tsokhas 1986; Blainey 2006). Domestically, the emergence and 
expansion of electrification came to have a decisive influence on 
state coal-mining policy through the commissioning of coal 
production plants to fuel state electricity commissions. State-
wide ownership and control of electricity production proceeded 
progressively from 1919 as comprehensive legal frameworks for 
industry regulation were developed and enabled the deployment 
of statewide transmission networks (Brady 1997). In the post-
war period, the construction of the 4GW Snowy Mountains 
hydro-electric scheme, a critical federal state project involving 
Liberal and Labour administrations and financially buoyed by 
international capital from the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, would enable the first 
interstate (NSW-VIC) transmission network interconnection, 
leading to the overall integration of the (South-Eastern) national 
electricity grid by 1995. Additionally, the Commonwealth 
Bureau of Mineral Resources, promoting a systematic 
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programme of research and geological surveying, facilitated the 
diffusion of technologies that initially developed as byproducts 
of the military innovations of the second world war generally 
quickened the pace of technical change in the energy sector, 
enabling the use of trained personnel, seismic surveys, aerial 
surveying and mapping, mineral-bearing land measurement 
(Brady 1997). This strategy was complemented by the Joint Coal 
Board and Coal Industry Tribunal, which oversaw the 
restructuring of the mining industry according to Taylorist 
principles of  mechanisation and scientific management in 
response to prolonged energy sector industrial disputes 
(Tsokhas 1986: 225).  
 
Neoliberal Regulatory Capture and Deepening Primitive Accumulation 
 
During the neoliberal era, the export-orientation of Australian 
resource extraction further intensified, facilitated by the gradual 
withdrawal of legislated state-system regulation and the 
concomitant regulatory capture by fossil-fuel capital. Coinciding 
with Australia’s deindustrialisation, the energy sector 
transitioned from ultra-protectionist to highly liberalised during 
the 1980s, facilitating Australia’s ascendence as world leader in 
coal export (World Coal Association 2015). Crough and 
Wheelwright suggest that the transnationalisation of Australian 
energy investment was heralded by the political instability and 
resource nationalisms of key energy exporters of post-colonial 
states, particularly the OPEC, giving Australia a relative sheen of 
stability (Crough & Wheelwright 1982).9 Concurrently, the state-
system’s project to pivot to world-leading aluminium production 
                                                      
9 While US investment in mining in the Global South fell from 56% in 
1959 to 32% by 1978, 85% of the increase in US foreign mining 
investment over that period took place in developed countries, and by 
1980, the developed Commonwealth countries accounted for 75% of 
total capital expenditure by US companies in mining and smelting, 
increasing from 23% in 1970 (Crough & Wheelwright 1982, 110).  
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and export was facilitated by concurrent cheap energy flows 
directly into the local smelting plants and unprecedented public 
drawing upon foreign credit streams (Crough & Wheelwright 
1983: 29). Consequent infrastructural projects of state 
governments involved the development of smelter-proximal 
power stations, yet were frequently mobilised to justify cuts in 
expenditure to other areas, most saliently in social welfare (Ibid: 
30).  
 
Australia’s devolved environment conservation regulatory 
regime was also cause and effect of the centrality of its fossil-
fuel exports to its national developmentalist logic. Pursuant to 
the state project of ensuring favourable conditions for energy 
resource appropriation, Linda Connor writes, a ‘series of 
legislative changes marginalised rural landholders in the 
planning process and perpetuated the exclusion of Aboriginal 
traditional owners, while enhancing opportunities for capital 
accumulation by resource extractive companies in a context 
where minimal exports were playing a larger role in economic 
growth’ (Connor 2016: 235). While the only piece of national 
legislation was devolved to state-levels, state-level legislation 
would increasingly centralise decision-making.10 This legislative 
pattern greatly reduced the influence of public submissions and 
democratic control over energy-generating policy. Rather, 
climate policy was effectively captured by the same interests that 
                                                      
10 This trend is discernible beginning with the Coal Acquisition Act 1981 
NSW, followed by the Coal Ownership (Restitution) Act 1990, which 
vested coal ownership in the Crown, and the creation of ‘State 
Significant Development’ amendments to the Environmental Protection 
Act 1997 NSW, giving the minister for planning centralised authority 
to approve any projects provided their conformity to developmentalist 
logic, to 2005 amendments withdrawing direct public stakeholder 
participation, and most recently legislated increases in the punitive 
measures for environmental protestors and moves to limit the appeal 
rights of third party objectors to energy mining developments.  
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bear greatest responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions (Baer 
2016: 197). A consortium of energy industry peak bodies 
coalesced as the ‘Greenhouse Mafia’ in response to increasing 
climate cooperation around the Kyoto Protocol, and positioned 
themselves as the federal government’s chief consultative 
committee on climate policy (Pearse 2009).11 Granted this 
significant buffer from democratic accountability, the federal 
and NSW states continued to approve infrastructural 
developments with major carbon emission implications, most 
significantly the Newcastle coal port expansion, while the few 
challenges mounted by the federal state-system to this ongoing 
Cheap Energy regime have been successfully opposed by mining 
industry lobbying.12  
 
Despite the global rapid depletion of easily accessed coal and its 
growing costs of oil production, Australia experienced a 
historically unprecedented boom in energy minerals mining 
from 2003-2013. This development, driven in large part by 
novel sources of demand from the world-system - now Chinese 
steel and concrete manufacturing plants - uniquely produced 
concurrent and unprecedented peaks in Australian terms of 
trade and resource investment (Gregory & Sheehan 2011). 
Reserve Bank analysis observes that 80% of financing for the 
2000s mining boom was foreign-owned, reflecting the 
                                                      
11 Including the Australian Coal Association (ACA), a major donor to 
both Liberal and Labor parties, the Minerals Council of Australia 
(MCA), the Business Council of Australia and the Australian 
Greenhouse Network (AIGN), with the latter including every major 
fossil fuel company operating in Australia. 
12 The Resource Super Profits Tax first floated by the Ken Henry 
review in May 2010 and endorsed by the Rudd government was 
quickly countered by mining-industry lobbyists partnered with the 
Coalition Government, which effectively led to significant weakening 
of proposed measures and the toppling of the Labor Rudd 
administration. 
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globalised financialisation of the world economy since the 
previous major mining boom in the early 1980s (Connolly & 
Orsmond 2011).13 Despite the global oversupply of coal and its 
structural decline as an industry, its deepening domestic 
extraction and export has been in large part facilitated by the 
ongoing federal state project to remain a ‘global energy 
superpower’, as promoted in its 2015 Energy White Paper 
(Morrison 2015; Department of Industry, Innovation and 
Science 2015). 
 
Electricity Infrastructure Ownership and the National Energy Market 
 
As with many other public goods, due to the capital-intensive 
processes necessary for the development of electricity networks 
and the long durations for their commercialisation to 
compensate initial capital expenditures, the state has typically 
lead the development of national infrastructure, and has 
consequently come to own much of the generation, 
transmission, distribution and retail aspects of the sector. 
Privatisation of the state-owned energy sector transformed it to 
become one of the most liberalised in the OECD, raising total 
proceeds in excess of $182bn since the late-1980s (Chester 
2015).  The combined state governments of Australia, 
agglomerated as the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG), initiated the restructuring of the industry in concert. 
Once vertically-integrated industries had become disaggregated, 
competitive bidding for electricity generating contracts became 
                                                      
13 Oil and liquid natural gas projects accounted for 92% of all 
advanced energy investment in 2011, with total capital expenditure 
valued at over $200bn, heralding Australia’s stepping into the world-
leading position in natural gas exports (ABARAS 2011: 15). The total 
value of energy exports increased from $24.3bn in 2002-3 to $76.2bn 
by 2011-2 before falling to $59.8bn by 2015-6, with LNG rising from 
$2.6bn to $16.6bn and coal rising from $12bn to $34.5bn (Department 
of Industry, Innovation and Science 2017).  
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possible on the newly formed National Electricity Market 
(NEM), in May 1997.14 
 
From its inception, the creation of the national electricity spot-
market required the expansion of attendant financial asset 
trading, primarily by hedging contracts reducing exposure to the 
volatility of spot-pricing of energy dispatches. This is driven by 
the necessary immediacy of electricity trading (it cannot yet be 
stockpiled to meet peaks and troughs in supply and demand) 
with its dispatch-based spot-pricing leaving participants 
vulnerable to highly volatile spot-market prices (Ruff 1994). 
Electricity prices are determined on the NEM by the AEMO 
matching generating capacity declared available by suppliers 
with the demand provided by distributors, attempting to achieve 
a least-cost solution to meet demand, assuming that bids reflect 
the marginal cost of bringing extra capacity into production. 
Critics have observed that in the day-to-day operation of the 
NEM, high levels of price volatility have not reflected supply 
shortages - and thereby indicated where extra generation 
capacity needs to be installed - but rather have been artificially 
created by generation companies exercising their market power 
via their ability to withhold capacity, permitted by the NEM’s 
rebidding rules.15 By 2012, trading of derivatives came to 
outweigh trade in the underlying assets fivefold, with the lion’s 
share of hedge contract trading undertaken by financial 
intermediaries (Chester 2012). This greatly expanded pool of 
electricity derivatives sold over the financial contracts market, 
rather than in the NEM directly, has a decisive influence on the 
                                                      
14 The NEM’s operations would be initially regulated by the 
NEMMCO, becoming the Australian Energy Market Operator 
(AEMO), the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) and the 
Australian Energy Regulator (AER) in 2009.  
15 A similar trend has occurred across the Californian electricity 
market, most notably the ‘Western Energy Crisis’ of 2000, caused by 
the illegal market manipulations of Texas energy consortium Enron.  
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actual prices for wholesale electricity, no longer formed in the 
context of supply and demand for electricity commodities but 
rather in the parallel financial market, whose price levels - 
assumed by market regulators to represent long-run marginal 
costs of production - tend to be overdetermined by broader 
financial market trends (Tang & Xiong 2011).  
 
3.2 The present ‘triple crisis’: energy, capital and 
climate 
 
Since the 2008 ‘global financial crisis’, numerous authors have 
described the state of the global economy as one of multiple 
crises across different domains converging through the 
homogenising dynamic of financial markets (i.e. Geels 2013; 
Chester 2013; Moore 2015). Moore (2015) rejects the analytic 
separation of environmental catastrophe from its social 
dynamics, developing instead an analysis of surfacing ‘negative-
value’, which co-situates ongoing, impending non-linear shifts 
of the biosphere, rising costs of production, and the ongoing 
overaccumulation of capital. While these costs can be 
internalised into the logic of value via market-based 
mechanisms, their underlying nature as negative-value is 
primarily ecological, social, and political; they accumulate within 
commodity frontiers and problematise the feasibility of the 
ongoing appropriation of Cheap Energy. 
 
Damaging ecological feedback into the energy system generated 
by the processes of Cheap Energy production is the most 
immediately apparent dimension of negative-value. This kind of 
damage occurs despite Australia’s relaxed environmental 
protection legislation, demonstrating the efficacy of negative-
value irrespective of pricing measures which seek the 
‘internalisation’ of costs through market-based mechanisms or 
penalties.  
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Australia is highly vulnerable to the southern climate oscillators 
El Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), a one-to-eight year 
cyclic intensification of climatic patterns whose negative and 
positive phases, El Nino and La Nina, respectively, have the 
strongest influence on year-to-year climate variability for most 
of the country. While ENSO has occurred since prior to the 
general intensification of extreme weather events heralded by 
climate change, its most recent iterations have been the most 
historically damaging. The severe droughts of 1982, 1994, 2002 
and 2006 are all associated with El Nino, as are the major 
Summer bushfire events including Ash Wednesday (16 February 
1983) and the 2002-3 and 2006-7 bushfire seasons, with the 
lowest peak snow depths on record all measured during El Nino 
years, notably in 1982 and 2006 (BOM 2014).16 Further, the 
warmth of recent El Nino events have been amplified by 
background warming trends, amplifying the severity of droughts 
and extreme temperature events they bring (Williams et al 2001).  
The 2015-2016 El Nino event, among the larger occurrences on 
record, was notable for causing extreme coral bleaching in the 
Great Barrier Reef, prolonged heatwaves across Australia, a 
severely foreshortened the cropping season, and major 
shortages in precipitation in the Snowy Hydro catchment region 
causing a severe fall in power generated by the hydroelectric 
scheme to a historic low of 2605 MWh (Robbins 2015). Open-
cut coal mines, which have become widespread across Eastern 
Australia during the late-20th century, are particularly vulnerable 
to extreme weather events and bushfires, the porousness of 
brown coal rendering it highly combustible during conducive 
environmental conditions (Melody & Johnson 2015). During the 
extreme heat events in summer 2014, embers spotting from 
nearby bushfires initiated a severe fire to breakout in 
                                                      
16 Despite this trend, however, BOM reports that not all major fires 
have followed El Nino years, with the Spring bushfires of October 
2013 occurring during an ENSO neutral year and Black Saturday (7 
February 2009) following a weak La Nina. 
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Hazelwood coal mine, Victoria, burning for 45 days, with total 
costs to public health, including the costs of relocating local 
communities in the wake of extensive fine-particle pollution, 
and mining infrastructure exceeding $100m (Parliament of 
Victoria 2014). Additionally, drought conditions affect mining 
and processing operations by creating inadequate water supply 
for extraction process, threatening production capacity to meet 
contractual commitments, intensifying conflicts with local 
communities over use of scarce common water sources, and 
reducing the availability of water for cooling in coal-fired power 
generation, which led to intermittent generator and network 
outages in Queensland throughout 2007 (AER 2007).  
 
The climatic instability and threat of cyclones and flooding 
heralded by La Nina have proven a greater cost to the 
Australian Energy Sector. The 2010-12 La Nina events, the 
strongest on record, caused widespread flooding across central 
Queensland after severe tropical cyclones (BOM 2012). Losses 
relating to these floods were evaluated at $30bn, with losses of 
$2.5b for the mining industry, not including consequently 
imposed legislative requirements for more stringent 
environmental protection (Easdown 2011). As summarised by 
the National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility 
(2013), ‘changes to historical climatic conditions, combined with 
the changing costs of production, are likely to increase the 
efforts required to protect physical assets, worker and 
community health and safety, and improve the environmental 
performance of operations before, during, and after extreme 
weather events’ (Mason et al 2013). Salient events include the 
flooding of the Ensham open cut coal mine in Queensland, 
sustaining $300m damages after production stopped for 6 
months; the flooding of the Queensland Baralaba open pit coal 
mine which was unable to produce coal for 5 months, and 
Victoria’s Yallourn open pit coal mine, the largest in Australia, 
which was permanently compromised in production capacity 
with electricity generation reduced by 25% for 6 months, 
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sustaining $109m in costs (Ibid: 5-6). Further flooding in 2013 
once again caused widespread stoppages of coal mines across 
Queensland, with compounding environmental effects caused 
by toxic minerals released into local waterways (Chambers 
2013). 
 
On Wednesday 28 September 2016, multiple tornadoes buffeted 
central South Australia, simultaneously damaging two 
transmission lines and causing voltage dips across the South 
Australian grid, compounded by wind-farm power reductions 
due to the activation of in-built protection features. An 
automatic compensation mechanism increased power imported 
from the Victoria-South Australia interconnector, overloading 
and tripping the interconnector, separating the SA power system 
from the NEM. State-wide supply in SA was lost, restarting later 
that day and not fully replaced for two weeks (AEMO 2017). At 
the time, South Australia’s energy generation mix was composed 
of the highest proportion of renewable energy in the country 
(~49%). While the intermittency of wind power was not 
deemed a material factor in the blackout by subsequent inquiry, 
with responsibility solely placed on the severe damage to 
transmission infrastructure, the Australian federal government 
immediately placed responsibility on the high penetration of 
wind turbines in the state, with prime minister Turnbull 
suggesting that ‘energy security should always be the key priority 
[...] a number of the state Labor governments have over the 
years set priorities and renewable targets that are extremely 
aggressive, extremely unrealistic, and have paid little or no 
attention to energy security’ (Grattan 2016). The event bore 
significance as a catalyst of the contradictory pressures operating 
within the state-system, surfacing as a conflict of strategic 
projects between the state (left-)Labor governments of South 
Australia and Victoria, and the federal Liberal government. In 
2017, South Australia surpassed its renewable energy target of 
50% by 2025, while committing $500m to building and 
operating a 250MW gas-fired power plant and a highly 
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publicised 100MW solar battery plant in partnership with South 
African battery developer Tesla (ABC News 2014).17 In the 
previous year, the Victorian government committed to 40% 
renewable energy generation targets by 2025, legislated in the 
Renewable Energy (Jobs and Investment) Bill 2017 (Energy Victoria 
2017) while its premier chastised the federal government for its 
‘absence of policy certainty’, forcing states to shoulder the 
financial burden ‘to fill the void’ consequently left (Willingham 
2017).  
 
Rising temperatures, peaking demand, and overaccumulated capital  
 
The artificial production of scarcity through overaccumulated 
capital is a core dimension of negative-value, with the effect of 
raising the costs of producing and consuming energy. Increased 
volatility and rising average wholesale and retail electricity prices 
has characterised the NEM’s operation a decade after the deep 
restructuring of the mid-1990s, with prices breaking from CPI 
and growing by up to 300% between 2005-2015 (ABS 2014; 
Chester 2015). The cause for these price rises has been the 
subject of considerable political and analytical controversy, and 
revolves around the three elements of electricity pricing: 
generation, distribution, and retail. At the level of generation, 
Clean Energy Council analysis suggests that these price rises are 
due to supply constraints, as Australia experiences persistent 
underinvestment in new electricity generation capacity to 
compensate for the closure of old coal power plants, the result 
                                                      
17 The South Australia-federal government conflict was epitomised in 
an unscripted press conference confrontation between the SA premier 
Weatherill and federal energy minister, the former accosting the latter 
for the Commonwealth government’s ‘white-knuckled panic about 
national energy policy [and it’s] $2bn admission that the national 
energy market is broken’, while the federal Treasurer later entered 
parliament brandishing a piece of coal (Norman 2017b). 
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of a lack of investor confidence given federal policy uncertainty 
(Thornton 2017). Conversely, other independent analysts 
suggest that such supply constraint is artificially produced, as 
operation of the NEM enables market power abuse by 
generators who ‘economically withdraw’ from supply provision 
to inflate prices in the wholesale market (Mountain 2016b; 
McConnell & Sandiford 2016). This behaviour was identified in 
South Australia in July 2016, where gas and diesel generators’ 
withheld productive capacity until spot-prices exceeded 
$5000/MWh, and was exhibited by Victoria’s Snowy Hydro 
plant in 2015, whose ‘economic withdrawal’ produced $30m 
windfall profits (Mountain 2016b).18 Moreover, supply-
constraints (whether artificial or real) must be assessed in their 
relation to peak demand, which in Australia has been decisively 
affected by increased air-conditioning uptake as average 
Summer temperatures rise (NEMMCO 2007).19 Nevertheless, 
financialisation of the NEM means that hedge contracting 
necessarily overdetermines final wholesale prices and thereby 
intervenes in the information signal transmission function of 
dispatch spot-pricing. Spikes or volatility in the resulting 
wholesale prices, occurring at consistently less than maximum 
demand levels, do not come to reflect shortage of capacity and 
fail to provide stimulus for new investment in baseload or 
peaking capacity (Chester 2013).  
 
At the network level, the AEMC estimated in 2013 that 
increases in distribution charges would contribute 81% to the 
rise in national average electricity prices from 2012-2015, while 
                                                      
18 Most recently this occurred on February 10th 2017 in NSW, when 
the AEMO issued multiple requests for NSW generators to fill a 
264MW shortfall to no response, despite underutilised gas firing 
plants. 
19 This is quite separate from overall average electricity demand levels, 
which are forecast to grow at a slower rate due to increased energy 
efficiency measures.  
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the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal estimated that 
NSW network charges increased by over 90% in real terms 
between 2008-2013 (AEMC 2013; IPART 2012). Increased 
network charges are commonly attributed to rapid expansion of 
capital expenditure in the transmission network by network 
companies, whose “gold-plating” investments during this period 
were incentivised by a new valuative methodology employed by 
the AER which allowed the value of a network’s regulated asset 
base to affect its return on capital, thereby seeking to stimulate 
asset replacement of an old and fraying pole-and-wire network 
(Quiggin 2015; AER 2013). This regulatory incentive was 
suggested by AEMO analysis, who have notably followed 
forecasting models that consistently over-estimated future base-
load electricity demand levels (AEMO 2016). Thus, network 
distributors have expanded network capacity beyond what was 
functionally necessary, creating a substantial risk of negative-
value accruing from stranded assets as new distributed energy 
resource (DERs) technologies become increasingly taken up by 
households and businesses.  
 
At the retail level, the Grattan Institute (2017) finds that since 
deregulation, retail companies across Australia (although 
particularly in Victoria) have preferred to generate super-profits 
by exploiting the complexity and lack of transparency in the 
tariff rate structures used in the retail market by offering 
conditional and limited discount periods while maintaining high 
standard contracts, rather than innovate in service-provision, as 
is expected by the common justification for market deregulation 
(Wood & Blowers 2017). These price effects are particularly 
impactful on vulnerable lower-income households, who typically 
have less capacity for undertaking the time-heavy procedures 
needed for discerning between the competing contracts 
available, as well as less disposable income with which to invest 
in smart-metering technology and distributed energy resources 
which reduce the long-run costs of electricity (Mountain 2016a; 
Chester 2013b). Increasingly, households turn to reducing their 
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overall energy consumption, which amplifies the long-term 
trend toward declining overall base load energy use, and further 
destabilises the existing overdeveloped energy transmission 
infrastructure (Gibbons & Singler 2008). 
 
Socio-political contestations  
 
As identified by Mitchell (2011) and Malm (2016), organised 
labour contestations were critical in raising the cost of 
production for energy extraction industrialists during the 19th 
and 20th century, a first instance of negative-value accumulating 
at the point of energy production. Steam-power fuelled by coal 
was economically advantageous for enabling rapid urbanisation 
which could attract large pools of cheap labour required by 
capitalist expansion, simultaneously providing inertia from 
intermittencies associated with extreme weather events and 
irregularities in the flow of renewable energies, and enabling an 
intensification of work performed by urbanised labour (Malm 
2016: 148, 188). However, the centralisation entailed by coal 
also granted coal miners relative bargaining strength, amplified 
by their position and concentration at bottlenecks in distribution 
points of the new fuel source (Mitchell 2011: 19). The history of 
coal extraction in Australia, and particularly NSW, has certainly 
been shaped by militant labour union striking, particularly 
during the late-1940s until the early-1980s, a period of 
‘disastrous’ industrial disputes which brought production across 
much of Eastern Australia to periodic standstills from energy 
supply shortages (Tsokhas 1986). The lack of accessible oil fuel 
(which had been managed into logistical supply chains that 
diminished militant worker resistance’s efficacy in hindering 
productivity in the United States) as a substitute predisposed 
industrial capital to demand harsh anti-union measures by the 
state-system to improve the constancy of energy flows (Tsokhas 
1986: 225). Today, as legacy of the Joint Coal Board’s 
mechanisms of ‘soft-control’, coal mines are one of the most 
highly automated workplaces in the country, with extremely well 
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remunerated labour, and where industrial disputes and work-
stoppages are relatively rare (Cosbey et al 2016).  
 
Instead, negative-value as rising cost of production tends to 
occur through direct action techniques that stop work at critical 
coal and gas extraction and transportation points, organised by 
diverse social movements that form uneasy coalitions between 
local Indigenous activists, environmentalist groups and NGOs 
and local farmers (Connor 2016: 239). While such engagements 
aim to stop work on sites and harm the profitability of 
extractive activity, little quantified data exists regarding their 
impact upon the productivity of coal mines, export ports and 
coal-seam-gas wells. Nevertheless, such protests prompted the 
Federal government 2015 Energy White Paper to identify ‘anti-
development activism’ including fossil-fuel managed funds 
divestment as ‘continuing challenges for resources development’ 
(Department of Science, Energy and Industry 2015). Such 
community challenges have included farmer-led opposition to 
the Shenhua Watermark Corporation open-cut coal mine 
proposal in the Liverpool Plains, resident-group Milbrodale 
Progress Association’s legal challenges to the Rio Tinto 
Warkworth mine extension, the complex coalition against the 
Maules Creek Whitehaven Coal mine, and most recently, the 
national movement to prevent the Adani Carmichael coal mine 
receiving federal approval, led by the Wangan and Jagalingou 
land council’s contested native title claim (Connor 2016; 
Burragubba & Johnson 2017). While meeting mixed success in 
preventing the development of energy projects, these coalitional 
agencies nevertheless create political toxicity surrounding the 
state-system’s legislative approval process, further deepening 
popular intuitions of political illegitimacy of governments 
finding themselves trapped within the ‘climate dialectic’ 
identified by Goodman (2016). Thus, the state-system, 
understood as a social relation, cannot but embody 
contradictory stances regarding its climate and energy policy 
when its energy regulatory policy remains captured by 
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transnational energy industry capital on one hand, while it 
concurrently requires formal democratic validation in electoral 
outcomes on the other, and consequent policy uncertainty that 
arises further discourages financial capital from investing in 
either fossil-fuel or renewable projects.  
 
*** 
 
This chapter has presented a history of Cheap Energy in 
Australia through an analysis of the close nexus between coal 
industry and state-system, emphasising how the state-system has 
facilitated the appropriation of large amounts of energy freely or 
close-to-freely through sponsoring technologies and 
infrastructures that enabled the expansion of commodity fossil 
fuel frontiers. During the neoliberal period, the withdrawal of 
direct government ownership over generation, distribution and 
retail of electricity has expanded the determining impact of 
financial actors in mediating the social-economic-climatic 
consequences of the operation of the electricity market, 
alongside a continued and expanded role of state regulation. The 
present period, since at least 2005, is characterised as one of 
converging crises within which climatic feedback, through 
extreme events and rising temperatures, have rendered the 
present network infrastructure an increasingly risky asset, 
vulnerable to increasingly consequential breakdowns. In this 
context, a new technics, based on the convergence of information 
technologies and renewable energies, has made possible an 
alternative, decentralised energy generation and distribution 
model, with potentially wide-reaching implications on the kinds 
of social-relations that it enables.  
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Chapter 4. Distributed Energy Resources 
and the Commodity Frontier 
 
While energy transition is ongoing and seemingly inevitable, the 
final shape that its constituent social relations take is not. One 
strong tendency advocated by state-systemic and finance-
industry actors is for a non-disruptive, ‘secure’, and hence 
centralised and privatised transition. Another countervailing 
tendency is toward decentralised and publicly-owned energy 
resources, made possible by distributed energy resource 
technologies (DERs). While such a transition heralds a clear 
potential for non-commodified and non-marketised social 
relations, as is recognised by Scheer (2002), Boyer (2017), 
Schwartzman (2017) among others, managerial approaches to 
DER transition have focused upon the innovation potential of 
the ‘smart-grid’ and prioritised methodological individualism in 
fostering attitudinal-behavioural change to adopt DERs. This 
chapter considers the responses of the state-system and capital 
tied to sunk costs in transmission and generation infrastructure 
to this emerging ‘technological style’ before providing an 
assessment on the world-ecological model developed above. 
 
4.1 The renewable energy institutional framework  
 
The technics developing around renewable energy technologies 
have been uniquely situated entirely within the neoliberal era. 
Unlike prior energy-sector technics, which have converged upon 
state-directed developmentalist narratives, renewable energy 
technology’s diffusion has been intimately linked with the 
operation of financialised market-based mechanisms. Within 
Australia, their financial feasibility has relied upon revenues 
generated through the selling of renewable energy certificates 
and from collecting highly-volatile electricity spot-market value, 
both of which are enabled and overseen by state-instituted 
markets in the RET and the NEM, respectively (Liebman 2014). 
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The RET, legislated by the federal state-system in 2001, creates 
a market for the trading of renewable energy certificates, which 
are provided to renewable energy generators who displace 1MW 
of fossil-fuel energy through either large or small-scale systems, 
with the overall aim of spurring 23.5% of Australia’s energy to 
be derived from renewable sources by 2020. The RET is 
composed of separate small-scale (SRES) and large-scale 
(LRET) schemes, with attendant small-scale technology 
certificates and large-scale generation certificates. Certificate 
generators include households, communities and businesses 
who voluntarily invest in small and large-scale renewable energy 
systems and create renewable energy to actively lower their 
consumption of main grid electricity. Certificate purchasers are 
industry groups mandatorily participating in the LRET, required 
to surrender certificates to offset the generation of emissions-
intensive energy, based on the volume of electricity they acquire 
each year (minus exemption certificates), according to a 
magnitude determined annually by the CER (CER 2016). The 
Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) and Clean 
Energy Finance Corporation complement the RET scheme 
through financing and coordinating the administration of 
support for research and development, demonstration and 
commercialisation of renewable energy technologies.  
 
Both forms of renewable energy certificates are floated on the 
RET. Nevertheless, while small-scale certificates have remained 
relatively stable due to the institutionalisation of a fixed-price 
clearinghouse, large-scale certificates have experienced severe 
price spiking, indicating persistent supply shortfall (Green 
Energy Markets 2017). This trend has been exacerbated by 
generator-retailer companies preferring to pay the cheaper 
legislated penalty and the provision of emissions exemption 
certificates for exposed industries in 2015 legislative 
amendments (CER 2017; Norman 2017a).  Such institutional 
failures are typical of market-based mechanisms when scope for 
advantageous market behaviour is recognised by market agents 
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with power over regulatory capture, as demonstrated by the 
history of emissions-trading schemes in Europe and 
internationally (Bryant 2016). Since the introduction of the 
SRES, solar PV has become the dominant DER, driven by their 
falling costs over 2009-10, the provision of small-scale 
certificates as subsidy, and the introduction of state-government 
feed-in tariffs (Jacobs 2017). From 2015-2016, the rate of DER 
uptake has fallen drastically, with the small-scale certificate 
multiplier diminished and the progressive withdrawal of feed-in 
tariffs (Ibid). Nevertheless, to date, small-scale renewable energy 
has exceeded 6GW of generating capacity, sufficient to displace 
11.2 MWh of electricity per year, with household penetration 
rates of greater than 1 system per 5 households, the highest ratio 
in the world. 
 
The Climate Change Authority (CCA) is required to produce a 
biennial independent panel review of the RET, chaired by 
leading figures of the energy and resources industry.20 The most 
recent report surmised that the RET ‘promotes activity in 
renewable energy ahead of alternative, lower cost options for 
reducing emissions that exist elsewhere in the economy. In the 
presence of lower cost alternatives, the costs imposed by the 
RET are not justifiable’ (CCA 2014). Further, the review found 
that the RET required a further $22bn cross-subsidisation to 
ensure that its present targets are met, coming ‘at the expense of 
investment elsewhere in the economy and the additional 
generation capacity is not required to meet the demand for 
                                                      
20 It was most recently chaired by Richard Warburton, chairman of 
Westfield Retail Trust, Magellan Flagship Fund and Citigroup, and 
chair of the Expert Advisory Committee on the Commonwealth EITE 
assistance program; Brian Fisher, executive director of ABARE; 
Shirley Veld, a former mining and energy executive (of WA’s Verve 
Energy, Alcoa Australia), and Matt Zema, CEO of the AEMO at the 
time. 
 
68 
electricity’ (Ibid). Consequently, ‘the adoption of a higher target 
and/or extension of the scheme beyond its current timeframe 
are inconsistent with the objective of reducing the cost of the 
scheme and would prolong a relatively inefficient approach to 
reducing CO2’ (Ibid). The Independent Review suggested that 
the SRES be fully wound back, as small-scale systems supported 
by the SRES had generated or displaced more electricity than 
initially projected at a cost two and a half times that of the large-
scale scheme. 
 
The ‘Independent Review into the Future Security of the NEM’ 
(hereafter the ‘Finkel Review’), released in mid-2017, explicitly 
acknowledged the failure of the existing NEM infrastructure to 
cope with ‘shifting policy imperatives and rapidly evolving 
technologies’ (Finkel et al 2017). The incorporation of  DERs 
and reduction of inertia-providing fossil fuel sources created a 
void in the provision of essential security services, including 
technical requirements of frequency and voltage control and 
response to power system disturbances. Moreover, it found that 
DER incorporation increased the complexity of power system 
operation by necessitating the management of large amounts of 
data and developing software architecture for stable operation, 
potentially leading to synchronised battery charging and 
discharging onto the grid in response to price signals or 
coordinated aggregator action, amplifying ‘ramp events’, and 
thus undermining the AEMO’s supply/demand forecasts. To 
this end, the development of fast-frequency-response measures 
has been prioritised by the AEMO, by (a) requiring new non-
synchronous generators (i.e. DERs and large-scale wind and 
solar) to have the capability to provide fast-frequency response, 
and (b) to subsequently establish a market for the provision of 
such services (AEMO 2017). Energy security can then be 
achieved through DER ‘orchestration’, i.e. ‘using 
communication signals to coordinate and optimise their 
dispatch in a dynamic manner’ (Finkel et al 2017: 63). To enable 
this kind of orchestration, however, the ‘AEMO requires data 
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on the location, capacity, technical characteristics, real-time 
output and consumption by controllable loads for new DER 
installations’, i.e. the integration of real-time data collection to 
enhance the ‘visibility’ of DERs (Finkel et al 2017: 63).  
 
Market approaches to DER organisation are commonly 
promoted for implicitly solving the visibility problem. This is 
achieved by incentivising the provision of DER data by owners 
to market operators to participate in the market (New York ISO 
2012; California ISO 2012; Essential Services Commission 
2017). The marketisation of such services in turn depends upon 
the development of a commercially-integrated technical system 
that includes controls built into ‘smart’ inverters that enable 
local voltage control and power shutdown in response to high 
system frequency, along with new business models for energy 
intermediaries such as aggregators/retailers that can bundle 
multiple DERs together and manage their grid interaction. This 
is complimented by the creation of ‘platforms’, i.e. the systems 
used to deliver an internet-based service, optimising and 
controlling distributed generation and consider data from 
weather forecasts, device status, market conditions, to 
constantly control distributed generation systems, as well as 
facilitating market interactions by providing an arena for the 
trade of goods and services. These visions of DER-led 
transition aim to achieve the ‘smart grid’, characterising an 
energy network of two-way flows of electricity and information 
interspersed through a macro, integrated grid that ensures ‘the 
optimal combination of local generation, energy storage, energy 
efficiency and new uses of electricity integrated with central 
generation and storage’ (Gellings 2015: 139). Such a complex 
interlocking of multiple technological, commercial and 
governmental modes of  producing, measuring and 
orchestrating a new ‘abstract social nature’ of captured solar 
irradiation constitutes a novel kind of emergent capitalist technics.  
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4.2 Technics and the expansion of the commodity 
frontier in DERs  
 
State-mediated technics: Solar irradiation mapping 
 
Numerous industry analysts and state regulators have sought to 
develop the means by which the commodity frontier may be 
extended to DERs, so that their increased uptake does not 
threaten to fetter the pre-existing centralised energy 
infrastructures. The state-system has introduced the Regulatory 
Investment Test, which requires network businesses to consider 
investment in DERs instead of expanding transmission 
infrastructure where financially feasible. ARENA has promoted 
the Network Opportunity Maps, developed by the Institute of 
Sustainable Futures, which complements such a project by 
visually integrating information regarding current and potential 
DER capacity with pre-existing energy infrastructure (Langham 
2014).21 It builds upon avoidable network cost models 
previously developed by researchers partnered with ARENA, 
the NSW department of industry and energy network 
companies, which generated maps of network capacity and 
constraints, planned investment and the potential value of 
decentralised energy in electricity networks across the NEM, 
that are publicly available online.22 The model has been applied 
for mapping DERs in Victoria and rural areas of the NEM, and 
                                                      
21 The data integrated in the NOM includes proposed network 
investments, cost of capital, network service providers’ demand 
forecasts for each network asset, current capacity of lines and 
substations and hourly load data. The annual deferral value 
($/kVA/yr) generated using such maps is calculated as: Proposed 
Network Investment ($) x (Cost of capital [% p.a.] + Depreciation) / 
support required in each year (kVA) (Dunstan and Langham 2016). 
22 See: <https://nationalmap.gov.au/renewables/>, viewed 4 August 
2017. 
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is fed into the Australian Renewable Energy Mapping 
Infrastructure data platform.  
 
A number of public and commercial research bodies have 
deepened this mapping project by generating real-time solar 
irradiation forecasting services, tailored to DER requirements 
(ARENA 2016). Solcast is a commercial R&D firm whose 
technological apparatus integrates data generated by the 
Himawari 8 (a geostationary weather satellite which observes, 
tracks and predicts cloud coverage across the Southern 
hemisphere at great precision) with numerical weather sources 
and output from the solar PVs measured through smart-meters 
in an online interface, presenting this information for end-users 
to generate a solar radiation power output forecast (Engerer et 
al 2017). Similar technology is developed by the Australian PV 
Institute, also funded by ARENA, through its SunSPoT solar 
potential map.23 Although currently freely available online for 
interested households, Solcast and SunSPoT’s ARENA 
partnerships aim particularly to commercialise their irradiation-
mapping technology, complementing the well-publicised state 
project of promoting commercial industry-academy linkages 
(Hare 2016; Martin 2016).  The sophisticated technical system 
set in motion by their projects has contributed to the 
production of ‘abstract social nature’ in solar irradiation, 
reduced to quantifiable equivalence by ‘removing the distinction 
between reliability driven projects and those motivated by the 
delivery of market benefits’ (AER 2013). While these 
technologies prefigure a technical ‘commons’, open to 
recuperation by non-commercial actors, their embeddedness 
within state regulatory and conditional R&D subsidy 
frameworks predisposes their ultimate commercial enclosure. 
 
 
                                                      
23 Australian PV Institute (APVI) Solar Map, viewed 29 August,< 
www.pv-map.apvi.org.au>.  
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Smart-grids and the ‘prosumer subject’ 
 
The integration of these DERs into a robust electricity grid 
through the extensive use of internet-equipped technologies is 
referred to as a ‘smart-grid’, which plays a central role in 
technocratic visions of the urban energy transition. The 
International Energy Agency (IEA) define the smart-grid as ‘an 
electricity network that uses digital and other advanced 
technologies to monitor and manage the transport of electricity 
from all generation sources to meet the varying electricity 
demands of end-users’ (IEA 2011). The smart-grid is both 
discrete and networked, including sensor arrays and attendant 
software infrastructure, which monitor and enable optimisation 
of power flows along transmission grids. Solar PV inverters, 
which connect PV systems to a public grid, residential energy 
management systems, in-home displays and access to energy 
market information, as well as grid-ready appliances and devices, 
constitute the smart-grid. (Gellings 2015).  
 
By encouraging the end-user’s increased interaction with 
communication technologies to achieve more efficient 
household energy supply- and demand-management, the ‘smart-
grid’ is lauded by STS scholars for creating a new kind of 
subjectivity, the ‘prosumer’ (Rathnayaka et al 2011; Hertig & 
Teufel 2016). Australian case studies have considered the 
participant experience and behavioural changes in response to 
‘smart-grid’ pricing/incentive mechanisms, i.e. dynamic tariffs, 
and/or home energy data feedback technologies (AEFI 2014). 
The clear majority of participants, according to the study, and 
particularly financially vulnerable households, experienced 
behavioural change, acting to flexibilize electricity consumption 
in line with market signals, with greater elasticity among more 
financially-vulnerable households. Another research cluster, 
collaborating with the CSIRO, found that while smart-grid 
technologies had a high level of acceptance among energy 
consumers and other stakeholders who accepted it as offering ‘a 
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genuine alternative to centralised grid supply’, most stakeholders 
believed that governments had the ultimate responsibility for 
energy security, supply, reliability, and providing a supportive 
regulatory and policy context to DER penetration. Nevertheless, 
most respondents expressed ‘a profound lack of confidence in 
government leadership to tackle climate change issues’ (iGrid 
Research Cluster 2011). In such a manner, subjectivist research 
considering smart-grid feasibility have (unintentionally) revealed 
the contours of the ‘climate dialectic’ within which the state-
system is caught.  
 
Distributed energy trading, the ‘Sharing Economy’ model and novel 
financial instruments 
 
DERs enable partial use of the current centralised energy 
distribution system, causing potential underutilisation of the 
grid, consequent rise in consumer charges, and threatening the 
viability of generator-retailer utilities as they currently exist. 
State-industry partnerships have responded to this concern by 
implementing local electricity trading and local network charges, 
i.e. reduced network tariffs for electricity generation used within 
a defined local network area (Rutovitz et al 2016). Two such 
proposed models are (a) many-to-one, where many individual 
DER generators provide energy that is aggregated and 
transferred to a single site, and (b) one-to-many, where a signal 
generator’s energy output is ‘split’ and transferred to many 
individual sites, i.e. either a municipally- or community-owned 
‘solar garden’ (McIntosh et al 2015: 5). Early analysis has 
suggested that when offered in tandem with local network 
charges, local electricity trading keeps electricity flows grid-
connected and maintains grid utilisation despite threats of 
autonomous DERs. Retailer surveys have found evidence of 
receptivity, with some utilities beginning to perform aggregator 
services that combine multiple DER assets to form portfolios 
and sell the products or services derived from that portfolio 
either into the wholesale energy market to capture high spot 
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prices, directly to network businesses, or as an ancillary service 
to the AEMO (KPMG 2017). Control is key: as KPMG 
observe, ‘the products and services, and therefore value, of any 
one portfolio would be subject to the individual technologies 
captured and the ability for the aggregator to collectively control 
these assets’ (KPMG 2017: 77-78).  
 
Another marketisation of DERs is through peer-to-peer trading, 
which requires the existence of suitable market trading 
platforms. Numerous start-up technology-based firms have 
recognised the potential for providing platform infrastructure 
for local electricity trading, and have begun partnering with 
ARENA and energy retailer-distributors to achieve market 
power. One such start-up, PowerLedger, utilises surplus 
renewable energy generated from residential or commercial 
DER, taking advantage of Blockchain technology, which uses a 
distributed ledger to facilitate settlements without an 
intermediary, creating an automated online trading platform for 
producers and consumers (PowerLedger Whitepaper 2017). 
PowerLedger is commercially deployed through Vector NZ and 
WesternPower, and achieved financing through publicly 
offering shares purchasable through cryptocurrency tokens 
(Scott 2017; Castles 2017). Its basis in Blockchain ledger and 
cryptocurrency technology is unique in enabling its peer-to-peer 
network to become profitable without requiring financial 
intermediaries, providing a trustless ledger system that settles 
payments transparently (PowerLedger Whitepaper 2017). 
Notably, blockchain-based peer-to-peer interactions prefigure 
energy exchange models that are decoupled from profit-
generating value-relations, although remain at risk of becoming 
internalised into capital through their acquisition and 
deployment by major utilities. 
 
Another Australian DER market developer, the Decentralised 
Energy Exchange (dEX) is a software-based platform created by 
Victorian technology company Greensync that enables 
75 
households and businesses to trade grid services provided by 
their DERs with local network operators (ARENA 2017). This 
open marketplace seeks to ‘make visible’ the value of energy 
generated by DERs via entering into power-purchasing 
agreements with retailers acting as energy service aggregators. 
The dEX was developed initially to promote demand 
management by assisting with spreading load-shedding, the 
voluntary reduction in electricity usage to prevent blackouts, by 
pooling the latent energy available behind-the-meter across the 
NEM, thus creating a virtual power plant (VPP). During peak 
events, the dEX offers households maximum grid price to 
surrender control of their DERs to network operators (Potter 
2017). The VPP is also bundled into a financial product that 
enables customised portfolios of DERs to be built and 
dispatched as needed in response to market fluctuations, and 
hedging against exposure to energy pricing. Another response of 
retailers follows the popular Californian models of retaining 
ownership of DERs while leasing them to households or 
contracting price-purchasing agreements (PPAs), where 
households pay for the solar energy that the system on their 
rooftop produces on a per-unit basis.24 As with dEX and 
PowerLedger, Australian start-up firms promoting this 
ownership platform have sought to merge with major utilities 
and telecoms companies, using a sharing economy model to 
scale up the project rapidly (Potter 2016).  
 
PPAs are increasingly important instruments of renewable 
energy project financing, defining the revenue and credit quality 
of a generating project, through circumventing utilities that are 
often unable to guarantee 100% renewable energy to customers. 
PPAs can be sleeved-physical, which are directly negotiated 
between corporate buyers and generators entering into 
associated arrangements, or synthetic-virtual, which are financial 
                                                      
24 In 2014, 72% of Californian residential solar capacity was leased by 
third parties. See: Litvak, N 2015.  
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derivatives where parties agree to a strike price with payment 
flows determined by comparison against market prices. The 
latter do not involve the delivery of energy output to the buyer 
but typically involve the transfer of green certificates to the 
corporate buyer from the generator for demonstrating the 
renewable nature of energy to be delivered to the buyer (Hedges 
2017). Major generator-retailers in Australia partnered with 
ARENA have also moved to capture the ‘innovation niche’ 
within VPPs, as heralded by AGL’s Adelaide test pilot that 
leases 1,000 inter-connected batteries to colocated households, 
generating 7 MWh of storage capacity and 5MW peaking 
capacity when discharged to the grid simultaneously during peak 
events (Vorrath 2017; AGL 2017). Such test pilots are strategic 
projects aimed at demonstrating viability for new business 
models that have not yet reached mainstream acceptance.25 
Financial agents, in coordination with the state-system and 
renewable energy retailers, have also experimented with the 
provision of cheap loans for households to equip themselves 
with DERs and demand-management technology. The 
Tasmanian Energy Efficiency Loan Scheme (TEELS), launched 
in May 2017, exemplifies this tendency, a joint initiative of 
Westpac Group, the Tasmanian Government and Aurora 
Energy, to provide $10m to households and small businesses for 
DER purchases on application for a Westpac Credit Card 
(Sustainable Living Tasmania 2017).  
 
4.3 A critical world-ecological assessment 
 
South Australian minister for energy, Tim Koutsantonis, 
acknowledges that ‘energy is not a commodity to be traded on 
the marketplace; it’s an essential utility’ - or, at least, it is difficult 
                                                      
25 With noteworthy irony, the launch of the AGL-ARENA VPP 
partnership was chosen as the site at which South Australian premier 
Jay Weatherill confronted Federal Minister for Environment and 
Energy Josh Frydenberg. 
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to commodify (Harnsen 2017). Recent expansion of local 
electricity trading and peer-to-peer, peer-to-aggregator and peer-
to-retailer DER energy markets, however, seem to indicate that 
the institutional space for commodified DER-generated 
electricity has expanded in response to growing concerns over 
the threat of widespread household grid secession. To what 
extent have the energy-sector’s actor-networks facilitated this 
marketisation of DERs?  
 
Firstly, the pre-existence of a centralised grid infrastructure, and 
the substantial investment fixed in its materiality, creates 
negative-value for utilities and other electricity market actors, 
who are compelled to ensure that their fixed capital is not 
stranded. Secondly, the privatisation of state-owned network 
enterprises and the ensuing emergence of the NEM has, in large 
part, prioritised the ‘rationalisation’ of energy production 
according to the demands of financialised commodity markets, 
repressing the social interest, which cannot be adequately 
captured in derivative-determined price signals. Thirdly, the 
expanded NEM regulatory space of the state-system is 
predisposed to ensure the NEM continues operating reliably 
and achieving politically advantageous household energy prices. 
Thus, the Regulatory Investment Test and the RET market-
mechanism effectively operate to tentatively encourage the 
development of DERs while ensuring they maintain integrated 
in physical grid infrastructure as well as the electricity market 
infrastructure it maintains. Fourthly, the state-system’s semi-
independent research incubator organs, including ARENA and 
CSIRO have facilitated a technics which maps and thereby 
rationalises extra-human natures to become legible for 
commodification by market actors, most pertinently in solar 
irradiation mapping and the promotion of an integrated 
demand-management-capable ‘smart grid’. Fifthly, existing 
‘gentailer’ enterprises have begun demonstration trials that 
orchestrate ‘smart grid-capable DERs into company-owned 
VPPs, achieving control over the resource and thus enabling 
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rent collection through its use. Finally, the emergence of 
numerous tech start-ups aiming to create platforms that ‘reveal’ 
the value of DER-based energy through ‘sharing-economy’-style 
marketability - frequently with state subsidisation - have 
generally sought not to destabilise pre-existing energy network 
enterprises through radically decentralised commercial models, 
but rather to partner with them to rapidly up-scale the 
commercialisation of their physical or digital technologies. Each 
of these tendencies, which have been illustrated in the sector 
survey provided above, generally reinforce the market-
orientation of DER-generated energy, and thereby serve to 
internalise the potentially disruptive social relations they can 
entail. 
 
Turning to the role of financialisation in Marxist literature, we 
may also now consider how transformation in the operation of 
the law of value has affected the uptake and nature of DER 
diffusion. We initially consider Bryan et al.’s (2015) thesis that 
within financialised capitalism, risk itself becomes the dominant 
‘substance’ of value, whose commodification in financial assets 
enables the shifting of risk-exposure onto illiquid households by 
highly liquid financial intermediaries. In this respect, the creation 
of the ‘prosumer’ subjectivity, of the rationally-acting engaged 
market participant who not only produces their own energy but 
is highly cognisant of their energy consumption and production 
vis-a-vis constantly updated market signals, is pertinent. The 
‘prosumer’, equipped with demand-and-supply-management 
smart-grid technologies, alters their own behaviours in response 
to the dictates of market signals, an elasticity which is 
heightened in more financially vulnerable households. Thus, 
rather than shouldering the risk of fluctuating wholesale 
electricity prices compounded by grid-wide energy imbalances, 
energy network enterprises can effectively shift such risks onto 
newly exposed households, who are faced with even more 
variegated financial incentives for behavioural modification. 
Additionally, concomitant with Bryan et al.’s concern with the 
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leveraging and ‘bundling’ of household debt-repayment streams 
as a differential but generally low-risk financial asset in 
mortgage-backed securities, we may identify a similar dynamic 
operating in the moves by energy market actors to generate and 
exchange power-purchasing agreements with financial 
intermediaries based upon DER-generated and aggregated 
energy streams. This enclosure of decentralised energy streams 
is complementary with international financial funds’ ongoing 
turn to purchasing network transmission infrastructures put to 
tender by neoliberalised state-systems, as was noted in the 
previous chapter (NSW Treasury 2017). 
 
Additionally, interest-free loan schemes as exemplified by the 
Westpac-Tasmanian TEELS, are provided to ensure that 
households can achieve greater energy expenditure-related 
savings and thereby stabilise their budgets and make more 
reliable debt repayments. There is little to prevent financial 
intermediaries from broadening the provision of such cheap 
loans, such as through mortgage-linked loans, the cheaper that 
DER-generated energy becomes, insofar as ensuring reliable 
streams of debt repayments are their chief concern. While the 
state-system’s endorsement of such financial instruments have 
been challenged by Tasmanian Greens MP Cassy O’Connor for 
‘setting up a corporate credit scheme with a major bank that 
exposes Tasmanians to a high debt risk’, their systemic 
significance vis-a-vis the triple crisis has not yet been noted 
(O’Connor 2017). Here we note pertinence of the Autonomist 
cognitive-cultural approach’s thesis  that in the post-
industrial/network-society, the substance of value increasingly 
becomes attentional and desiring labour. Converging smart-grid 
capable and informational-communicative platform 
technologies that interconnect households and grid-service 
providing enterprises make possible the effective shifting of 
electricity market fluctuation risk-exposure onto households. 
This follows the post-Fordist tendency in advanced capitalist 
economies to appropriate value from socially-reproductive 
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activities, such as those concerning securing affordable energy, 
induced by the nascent proliferation of individualised demand-
management technologies.  
 
*** 
 
Summarising the Marxist critique of the viability of a market-led 
energy transition, biogeochemist David Schwartzman writes that 
 
We are now confronting a clean energy transition that is still 
too slow. And only when a more robust renewable creation 
is coupled with rapid phase-out of fossil fuels … will there 
be any chance of avoiding climate catastrophe. There is 
every reason to believe that a full transition with these 
characteristics cannot be generated in the capitalist 
framework. (Schwartzman 2016) 
 
In stark contrast to the steady market-oriented transition 
legislated by the Australian state-system, alongside Scheer’s 
more reformist prescriptions, Schwartzman articulates an 
alternate program of radical energy transition toward socialised 
ownership of the means of production, emphasising the 
importance of altering the social relations underpinning the 
energy system (Schwartzman 2017: 153). Nevertheless, as this 
investigation has shown, the inertia inherent to grid 
infrastructures and their attendant industrial-financial capital 
dampens the promise of social transformation through the 
state-led recuperation of energy generation. Against the 
optimism of Quiggin (2017), who suggests grid renationalisation 
as the solution to the compounding challenges faced by the 
NEM, we follow Jessop (2016) in seeing strategic-selectivity of 
the federal state-system as too deeply predisposed to further the 
conditions of value extraction to orchestrate the re-integration 
of the deeply splintered NEM and its private operators. 
Particular organs of the state-system have a greater capacity to 
facilitate the de-commodification of energy generation, such as 
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the South Australian and Victorian state-government projects to 
promote publicly-owned large-scale renewable generation 
projects and by the currently open-source nature of solar 
irradiation mapping technology. The most promising agents of 
radical energy-socio-ecological transformation remain the 
households and communities whose separate and collective 
efforts - made possible by technological mediation - prefigure a 
relation to energy that sidesteps market-dependency. These 
projects, which emphasise democratic ownership over DERs, 
operate tenuously outside of the standard operation of the law 
of value, and simultaneously threaten the security of the energy 
grid infrastructure as it exists in a market-centric framework. 
They are the subject of a brief discussion in the conclusion 
under Weinrub’s (2016) rubric of ‘energy democracy’, realising 
somewhat Gibson-Graham’s (2005, 2015) alternative modes of 
socio-economic provisioning that effectively carve spaces out 
from the totalising reach of the capitalist world-system.  
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Conclusion 
 
Between the prevailing vision of a gradual, evolutionary 
transition in the socio-technical system toward market-oriented 
renewable energies, and the world-ecological critique of green 
capitalism, we may situate the ‘energy democracy’ paradigm, 
which rejects capitalist social relations whilst providing a 
positive program for energy transition. It has been described as: 
 
A way to frame the international struggle of working people, 
low-income communities and communities of colour to take 
control of energy resources from the energy establishment 
and use those resources to empower their communities … 
Energy democracy seeks to reframe energy from being a 
commodity that is commercially exploited to being a part of 
the commons. (Fairchild & Weinrub 2017: 16) 
 
The energy democracy paradigm brings together a concern for 
reclaiming ownership over energy generation and distribution 
while negotiating the complexities of scale and power in 
contemporary global capitalism. Its advocates advance a critique 
of ‘solar individualism - or techno-utopianism’, noting the 
propensity for a project such as the ‘smart-grid’, ostensibly 
based around empowering households to dictate the terms of 
their energy consumption and production, to be internalised 
into pre-existing capitalist social relations (Aronoff 2016). 
Centralised renewable energy generation, based on large-scale 
generating systems and a unidirectional distribution network 
would, according to the energy democracy approach, reinforce 
concentrated financial and economic power, aided by a 
corporate state apparatus unfettered by democratic restraints 
(Fairchild & Weinrub 2016: 21-22). Moreover, as Bohm et al. 
argue, ‘capital, the state and discourses of development 
continuously seek to ‘recuperate’ autonomy and make it work 
for their own purposes’ (Bohm et al. 2010: 27). These processes 
of recuperation are often part of the process of ‘accumulation 
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by dispossession’, the extension of private property rights and 
market rules into new jurisdictions and spaces of nature 
characteristic of the neoliberal era (Harvey 2003).  
 
Rather, devolved modes of prefiguring system-wide transition 
via community or household-based energy generation models 
are closely related to the Autonomist tendency to eschew state-
centric governance models for diverse ‘horizontalist’ social 
movements (Hardt & Negri 2004). Autonomists evoke the 
commons ‘viewed as collective spaces created ‘outside’ of the 
workings of capital, where different social relations and norms 
can be sustained’ (Cumbers 2012: 169). The technologically-
mediated reintroduction of such a commons can enable 
democratic participatory and horizontal model of ownership, 
respecting local difference and diversity of ownership forms 
against market-driven capitalist or statist socialism, which 
invariably impose non-democratic modes of domination 
(Holloway 2002). However, energy democracy, when refracted 
through Jessop’s strategic-relational-approach, departs from the 
Autonomist tendency for essentialising the state-system as 
removed from social pressures. Instead, it endorses a 
‘reconstituted and pluralistic approach to public ownership that 
prioritises economic democracy and public participation’, which 
recognises the relative advantages and disadvantages of the 
variegated modes of public ownership, whether fully 
decentralised, municipalised, regionalised or nationalised 
(Cumbers 2012: 224). As precursors, the energy transitions of 
Denmark and Germany have demonstrated the integral role of 
remunicipalisation for decarbonisation, enabled by strong 
historic localist traditions with high levels of cooperative and 
mutualist ownership across numerous economic sectors and 
facilitated by favourable regulatory regimes (Cumbers 2012 and 
2016).  
 
What, then, are energy democracy’s prospects in Australia? 
What historical traditions can enable or hinder the mobilisation 
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of such a program? As detailed in Chapter 3, the history of 
Australia’s energy regime has been dominated by state-led 
transnationalised coal production and electrification programs, 
and its electrification mostly coordinated by centralised 
administrative bodies. The lack of a strong pre-existing localist 
tradition in settler-colonial Australia, despite its European 
history, has hindered the rapid cultural take-up of communal 
energy projects. There nevertheless exists a budding movement 
around energy democracy, operating across multiple scales of 
governance, bolstered by the country’s significant advantage in 
availability of DERs and deep penetration of household 
photovoltaics. As of 2015, community energy in Australia 
includes 50 projects with a total generating capacity of 10MW, 
having attracted $23m in community-sector finance, and 
another 40 projects in development (C4CE 2015; Hicks and 
Mey 2014). The sector has received financing and coordinating 
support from the federal state-system through ARENA and the 
Solar Communities and Towns programmes (Frontier Impact 
Group 2017; Department of Environment and Energy 2015).  
 
At a more devolved regional level, community energy projects 
also intersect critically with the ‘just transitions’ movement that 
has come to the fore in discussions of coalitional social 
movements facilitating the transition of rural and regional 
communities toward renewable energy (Canadian Labour 
Congress 2000, 3). Proponents of just transition, such as the 
International Trade Union Confederation, seek to overcome the 
hegemony of ‘jobs versus environment’ discourse as commonly 
mobilised by state officials working in tandem with fossil-fuel 
capital. Australian scholars argue that regional movements 
framed around just transition ‘are challenging and disrupting 
hegemonic identities of individuals and communities’ in regions 
historically tied with fossil fuels (Evans & Phelan 2016: 330). 
Such synergetic campaigns are critical for the demands of local 
energy democracies to congeal at wider scales. The analysis 
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forwarded above has furnished several promising points of 
departure for grafting such alliances. 
Within the urban context, contemporary informational 
technologies’ and communicative platforms’ tendency toward 
networked individualism suggests a further opportunity for 
energy transition to become devolved and brought into civil 
ownership. A critical understanding of the ‘bounded 
relationality’ of technology envisages the delinking of such 
technologies and platforms from the commercial imperative, 
against the recuperative efforts of energy capital. Blockchain-
based currencies, whilst still in their infancy and relatively 
inaccessible to laypeople, are a promising avenue of non-
capitalised tokens enabling networked interactions vis-à-vis the 
sharing of energy between households (Lotti 2015; Delahaye 
2017; Greenfield 2017). Models of public platform ownership 
have been suggested by contemporary critics of technology and 
the ‘sharing economy’, although its application to energy-sharing 
has not yet been developed (Bratton 2015; Srnicek 2017). 
 
For the sake of brevity, several aspects of the Australian energy 
transition and the DER quandary have not been addressed 
adequately in the foregoing discussion, nevertheless important 
avenues of enquiry. The first concerns large-scale renewable 
energy projects - the other, perhaps more energetically 
significant development - not considered in this work. Small-
scale systems were the subject of this study for their promise in 
facilitating decentralised communal social relations. Therefore, 
the counter-case vis-à-vis large-scale renewable projects has not 
been explored here. Nevertheless, tracing the transnational 
political economy of such internationally-financed projects is an 
important task, and one suited to the world-ecological 
framework. The second concerns the class dynamics of DER 
ownership. While it has been the emphasis of this thesis to look 
towards modes of postcapitalist provisioning that seek to 
overturn class structures generated by capitalist value-relations, 
it shies away from concretely engaging with the class character 
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of households which have already taken up DERs, and the 
implications of this for further deepening or ameliorating pre-
existing class division. Furthermore, while the capacity of DERs 
to be rapidly mobilised outside of urban areas clearly heralds 
material benefit for rural Indigenous communities, increasingly 
under threat by the withdrawal of state-services by a state-
system operating in tandem with transnational extractive 
industry, the already-existing trends have not been the focus of 
analysis here.  
 
The third avenue of research considers the tendency of the 
neoliberalised state-system toward authoritarianism when 
increasingly under pressure by globalised finance and the 
‘climate dialectic' (Jessop 2016; Bruff 2014). The implications of 
this have been particularly astute with respect to securing energy 
resources in the wake of ecological disasters (Red 2017). This 
has been considered with respect to the state-system’s 
invocation of ‘energy security’ as a discursive strategy of final 
appeal, although its materially-coercive aspects have mostly 
related to export-oriented fuel production, and so has not been 
a core concern of this thesis, which has chiefly considered 
domestic electricity generation, distribution and consumption. 
The clear significance of these trends to climate justice and 
world-ecological outcomes, however, justifies further enquiry. A 
final area of worthy research would uncover the global 
commodity chains and the attendant socio-ecological aspects of 
the production and distribution of household solar photovoltaic 
panels. The complex and often environmentally damaging 
practices involved in the extraction of their component metals 
and manufacturing have been noted elsewhere, although not yet 
integrated into critical global commodity chain political 
economies, a project complementary to the world-ecological 
analysis developed here (Fthenakis & Kim 2011; Turney & 
Fthenakis 2011). 
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This thesis has argued that for Australia’s ongoing energy 
transition to be socio-ecologically sustainable, it must move 
beyond a centrally-imposed technology-centric and market-
dependent model, to incorporate models of socialised 
ownership over the generation and distribution infrastructure of 
energy. To develop this argument, the thesis moved through 
two parts: theoretical and empirical. Each engaged critically the 
extant scholarship concerning energy transition and technology 
and then brought a critical lens to bear upon Australia’s current 
transition.  
 
The first part juxtaposed the mainstream and heterodox 
theoretical approaches to conceptualising energy transition 
governance, which were demonstrated to differ primarily over 
their incorporation of value and class-centric determinants of 
technical-social change. Both heterodox and mainstream 
approaches were criticised for maintaining essentialised theories 
of technology, either positing its neutral instrumentality or 
reducing it to an implement of domination for the capital 
relation. Rather, the ensuing discussion explored the potential of 
technical objects and systems to provide the material basis for 
alternative social relations. To provide a value and class-
theoretic approach, the world-ecological framework was 
critically extended to emphasise a contemporary value theory 
that accounts for finance and broader forms of appropriated 
labour. Further, to maintain an institutionally-cognisant 
historical materialism, the framework was situated alongside 
contemporary debates over the role of the state-system and 
infrastructures in mediating socio-ecological conflicts.  
 
The second part sought to bring this framework to bear in 
illuminating the determinants and possible pathways of 
Australia’s current energy transition. It began by tracing a brief 
history of ‘cheap energy’, emphasising the role of the state-
system and its interaction with competing fractions of capital in 
securing energy for domestic and international consumption vis-
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à-vis the world-system. Deregulation has exposed infrastructures 
to market-dependence and enabled the commodification of 
electricity traded over the NEM, accelerating the emergence of 
socio-ecologically growing negative-value. The threat of fettered 
capital has pressured the state-system to extend the commodity 
frontier through new infrastructures, markets, and technologies 
that enable new flows of secure and cheap energy. The thesis 
culminated in an investigation of distributed renewable energies 
(DERs) as technical objects predicated upon new abstract-
social-natures, and systemised into a ‘smart-grid’ with potential 
to enable alternate social relations over energy generation. The 
hegemonic role of finance over the institutional orchestration of 
these technics was shown to threaten to co-opt their disruptive 
capacities by enframing their uptake in an individualised and 
market-oriented manner, where risk-absorption is forced onto 
households.  
 
Critically, these technological and economic processes are 
continually contested. By bringing a relational concept of 
technicity and a spatially-sensitive politics to world-ecology, the 
approach developed here has sought to illustrate novel forms of 
commercial enclosure and the actual and potential sites of 
publicly beneficial recuperation within the Australian energy 
sector.   
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